Browsing by Author "Leuschner, Elena"

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Asymmetric Responsiveness: The Effects of Protesters’ Demographics and Policy Preferences on the Political Agenda
(2024-11) Leuschner, Elena; The Quality of Governmen Institute
Previous research predicts that politicians are responsive to citizens with whom they share demographics or policy preferences. I argue that protests are particularly susceptible to politicians’ di!erential responsiveness. First, protesters’ demographics are relatively easy to identify, potentially increasing politicians’ felt responsibility to respond to protesters they descriptively represent. Second, protests are often perceived as less legitimate than other forms of participation, justifying politicians’ responsiveness to those they substantively represent. In a pre-registered experiment, I tested how 1124 Swedish local politicians respond to protests that vary in who is protesting and what policy demands they raise. Uncertainty is large around the e!ect of shared demographics. In contrast, shared policy preferences increase responsiveness asymmetrically: Left-wing politicians are more responsive but show greater di!erentiation, favoring co-partisan protesters over others. Exploratory analyses reveal that politicians’ priors on protest legitimacy explain why right-wing politicians di!erentiate less and are less responsive to protests, even right-wing protests.
The Dynamics of Emotions in Protests
(The Quality of Government Institute (QoG), 2023-10) Leuschner, Elena; Versteegen, Peter Luca
This paper investigates the role of emotions during protest participation. While multidisciplinary research considers negative triggers a crucial factor for protesting, few studies causally test whether negative emotions initiate protesting and motivate continued protest behavior. Addressing these gaps, we present a model that explains when and why emotions matter throughout protest participation. Online experiments in the US (total N = 1,603) show that, surprisingly, neither negative nor positive emotions motivate individuals to start protesting (vs. issue salience). However, protesting decreases negative and increases positive emotions. The latter motivates protesters to continue protesting. Results hold among political and demographic predispositions as well as across several negative and positive emotions (e.g., anger). The finding that positive emotions motivate protesters to continue protesting helps explain why movements decline or endure. Ultimately, as sustained mobilization facilitates protest success, emotions are central in protesting, even if they do not cause initial protest participation.
Experimental Evidence from Belgium on Local Politicians’ Engagement with Protests
(2024-09) Leuschner, Elena; The Quality of Government Institute (QoG)
When do politicians react responsively to protesters demands? I argue that politicians react responsively to protests they anticipate their voters to support — peaceful, large, and actionable protests. In an experiment with Belgian local politicians (N = 1003), I randomize protest scenarios that vary how peaceful and large protests are, and how actionable protesters’ demand is. Results show that peaceful protests prompt the most responsive reactions, whereas large protests are more limited to influencing a party’s agenda. However, among politicians who perceive protesters as their voters (in this case leftwing politicians), moderately disruptive actions still prompt politicians to listen to protesters’ demands. Whether demands are formulated in an actionable way does not affect politicians’ reactions when compared to abstract demands. This study contributes to understanding when and how politicians are responsive to their constituents in the case of protests and shows that being peaceful shapes politicians’ incentives to react responsively.
School’s out! Information Cues and Retrospective Voting in the Case of School Closures in Sweden
(2022-09) Gren, Simon; Leuschner, Elena; The Quality of Government Institute
While researchprovidesevidencethatvoters’considergovernments’ past performance,littleisknownaboutwhichinformationvoterspay attentionto.Wesuggesttwocompetingtheoriesofretrospective voting:Outcome-orientedvotersonlyreacttothepolicyoutcome, whereas position-orientedvotersconsidertheinitialproposalasin- formativeoftheincumbent’spolicypositionandpunishthemforthe unpopularidea.Wetesttheseopposingmechanismsusingthecase of widelyunpopularschoolclosuresandoriginallycompiledgranular data onSwedishlocalelectionsresultsfrom2002to2018.Weexploit within municipalityvariationinvotingacrosstimetocausallyesti- mate theconsequencesforincumbentsintheneighborhoodsurround- ing theschools.Ourresultsconfirmthatvoterspunishincumbents for closingaschoolbutalsoforwithdrawingtheproposal:theyvote position-oriented.Ourfindingshaveimplicationsfortheunderstand- ing ofretrospectivevotingandwhichinformationcuesvoterslook backto.
The Causes and Consequences of Government Concessions to Protests
(2024-12-10) Leuschner, Elena
Political street protests are a prominent form of political participation worldwide that transcends political regimes and ideologies. When governments give in to protesters' demands and grant concessions, these concessions are often assumed to indicate a protest's success and end. This is, however, not always the case. I argue that we need to take into account that governments cannot be certain their concession will satisfy protesters, and protesters cannot be certain about their success. Reconsidering governments' incentives to grant concessions, I conceptualize concessions as merely ambiguous signals of success and ask what the causes of such concessions are. Further, since concessions might be ineffective at ending protests, I ask what the consequences of concessions are. To study these questions, I contribute four empirical papers. Investigating the causes of concessions, I conducted survey experiments with politicians in Belgium and Sweden. Paper 1 shows that politicians are most likely to concede to peaceful protests unless they expect their voters to be present, which makes them more tolerant of protesters' disruptive tactics. When protests are large, they are likely to talk within their party about the protest but also police it. In paper 2, I find that shared policy preferences between politicians and protesters increase politicians' willingness to concede to protesters. Priors toward the legitimacy of protests, however, influence this willingness. Regarding the consequences of concessions, in paper 3, Sebastian Hellmeier and I find that protests in authoritarian states are likely to continue after government concessions. We discuss these findings in the light of credible commitment problems between the state and protesters. In paper 4, Simon Gren and I show that concessions in the form of responsive withdrawals of unpopular policies are not electorally rewarded by Swedish voters. This points towards a challenge for incumbents when choosing whether to concede.