Browsing by Author "Lundstedt, Martin"

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Finanskriser & Transparens - En studie om korruption ur ett collective action-perspektiv
(2018-02-20) Hansson, Jonas; Lundstedt, Martin; University of Gothenburg/Department of Economics; Göteborgs universitet/Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik
Corruption is a widespread problem in large parts of the world. Studying the phenomenon and putting forward useful propositions for decreasing corruption is therefore of immediate importance. A recent contribution to understanding corruption is viewing it as a collective action-problem. This view proposes that the solution, that is, decreasing corruption through collective action, is a large crisis that opens a window of opportunity through which action against corruption can be undertaken. However, so far this proposal lacks empirical scrutiny. This study examines this solution by looking at the effect of financial crises on the level of transparency, a proxy for a larger institutional change, in 64 systematically corrupt countries. We find no general relation between financial crises and change in transparency, but when looking at the effect on different regime types we find a small increase in transparency for liberal democracies. Our conclusion is that a crisis in general won’t lead to collective action against corruption, but that a crisis in liberal democracies can generate this process.
Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization
(V-Dem Working Paper, 2022-10) Sato, Yuko; Lundstedt, Martin; Morrison, Kelly; Boese, Vanessa A.; Lindberg, Staﬀan I.; V-Dem Institute
Are there patterns in the sequences of institutional change when democracies autocratize? If so, are such patterns distinct for democracies that transition to authoritarianism versus those that avert democratic breakdown? The Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset provides a global sample of all 69 autocratization episodes between 1900-2021. Using this data and pair-wise domination analysis, we describe the general order of reforms in 31 variables which make up diﬀerent types of accountability mechanisms constraining the government. Our ﬁndings suggest that institutional decay starts with horizontal accountability, followed by declines in diagonal accountability, and, ﬁnally, vertical accountability. This pattern becomes more appar-ent in countries with low democratic stock and during the third wave of autocratization. This study makes strong contributions to a growing academic literature on patterns of autocrati-zation as well as initiatives among policymakers and practitioners to counteract autocratization.
Institutions of Electoral Integrity and Clientelism: The Role of Electoral Management Bodies
(2020-09) Lundstedt, Martin; Edgell, Amanda B.; V-Dem Institute
While clientelism is most often viewed as a symptom of traditional politics, empirical evidence suggests that it is actually a varied and multifaceted phenomenon, found in widely differing economic, political, and cultural contexts. As a result, our understanding of how formal institutions affect clientelism remains limited. This article integrates research on clientelism and electoral integrity, arguing that as the capacity of electoral management bodies (EMBs) increases, the costs of clientelism increase for voters, parties, and candidates. As a result of this increasing cost, we anticipate that declines in the supply of clientelism are associated with advances in EMB capacity, all else equal. This theory is tested using V-Dem data, covering more than 160 countries from 1900 to 2016, as well as several alternative measures of both EMB capacity and clientelism as vote buying. This multifaceted empirical approach finds strong support for the theory that EMB capacity decreases the supply of clientelism at the country-level.