Browsing by Author "Malmgren, Helge"
Now showing 1 - 20 of 20
- Results Per Page
- Sort Options
Item Artificial Neural Networks in Medicine and Biology. A philosophical introduction(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2000) Malmgren, HelgeItem Automatic Computer-Based Diagnosis in Acute Abdominal Pain(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2008) Nalin, Kajsa; Malmgren, Helge; Gunnarsson, Ulf; Laurell, Helena; Åberg, Malin C. B.; Hansson, Lars-ErikItem Conditions for forced learning of graded responses(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2002) Malmgren, HelgeItem Descartes "misstag"(2010) Malmgren, Helge; Humanistiska fakulteten, Göteborgs universitetHumanistiska fakulteten vid Göteborgs Universitet har erbjudit oss som visade upp vår forskning vid Humanistdagarna i april 2010 att också författa var sitt bidrag till föreliggande nätpublikation. Det visade sig vara inte helt enkelt att skriva en kort artikel som anknyter till båda de presentationer jag hade vid Humanistdagarna – Kropp, själ och psykisk sjukdom: ett möte mellan filosofi och psykiatri respektive Neurala nätverk och modeller för mänskligt tänkande. (De är båda tillgängliga på Internet som nr 54 och 55 i Filosofiska Meddelanden, Webserien, http://www.flov.gu.se/publikationer/fm/web/.) Men så småningom konvergerade tankarna på ett mycket naturligt sätt till min läromästare bland läromästare: René Descartes. Så den här lilla uppsatsen blir en betraktelse över Descartes, några av hans argument och en av hans belackare.Item Epilepsy, economics and ethics(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1998) Malmgren, HelgeItem The essential connection between representation and learning(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2006) Malmgren, HelgeItem Fatigue and fatigability - semantic and etiologic perspectives(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1998) Radovic, Susanna; Malmgren, HelgeItem Inlärning och minne i neurala nätverk(Författaren, 2020) Malmgren, HelgeItem The "internal/external" metaphor in the philosophy of mind(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2000) Malmgren, HelgeItem Medvetandet och kroppen. Psykiatriska och filosofiska perspektiv(Göteborgs universitet, 2020) Malmgren, HelgePresentationen börjar och slutar i temat drömmar. Däremellan behandlas hypnagoga hallucinationer, utomkroppsliga upplevelser, begreppen yttervärld och omvärld, kunskapen om kroppens inre, begreppet kroppsschema, samt kroppsschemats tidslighet.Item Memory, emotion and brain injury. Some lessons from classical "organic" psychiatry(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2008) Malmgren, HelgeItem Perceptual fulfilment and temporal sequence learning(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1997) Malmgren, HelgeWhat happens when an expectation of a certain perceptible event is fulfilled? Traditional empiricist theories about intentionality, as well as several recent theories about mental imagery, emphasise the concrete similarity between expectations and perceptions. For example, one can almost "hear in one's head" a melody which one is anticipating. This has been the starting point for many theories which postulate some kind of similarity matching between the expectation and its fulfilment. According to such theories, an analogue mental representation of the expected fact is "held up" against the incoming percept, and their similarity or non-similarity determines whether the expectation is or is not fulfilled. If such theories are taken as descriptions of phenomenologically accessible facts, they are difficult to defend. First, analogical expectations - when they do occur - usually do not persist into the fulfilment phase. And how could they be matched for similarity, if they are not available at the same time? Second, many cases of expectation do not involve any imagery at all but only reveal themselves as a feeling of surprise if they are not fulfilled. The philosophical literature abounds with arguments against the thesis that concrete similarity to a certain percept is essential for an expectation to have that percept as its object. But of course these are not arguments against cognitive and/or neural-network theories which entail that simultaneous matchings are performed below the introspectively accessible level; such an assumption is often used in explanations of perceptual learning. I here suggest a simple alternative theory of the nature of matching in such learning. Suppose that thought and perception alternate using the same representational medium, and that the contents of this medium are being continuously fed into the cognitive system which produces thought. Such a common feedback/input mechanism will, in itself, give rise to learning because at each alternation from expectation to perception, the system will perform an implicit matching. If the percept is sufficiently dissimilar to what would have occurred in the common medium without perception, the cognitive system will tend to switch to another region of its state-space, in which other kinds of expectations are produced.Item Quantifying Quality of Life(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1997) Malmgren, HelgeThe concept of quality of life (QoL) which is most relevant to medical and medicopolitical decisions is QoL as goodness of life, e.g., the value of a life for the person who lives it. Mainly because of the interdependence of values, components of an individual human life cannot be ordered in such a way as to permit a complete and context-free ordinal scale. However, local orderings (given a set of fixed conditions) can often be found. Similarly, although local ratio scaling of the desirability of life components using direct ratio estimation seems to be possible, the scales cannot be made complete. Ratio scale values assigned by an individual to the goodness of life components by estimation need not always be even locally additive, since there may not exist any principle of composition. By statistical means, representations of (something like) the value of life components have been derived, which are locally near-additive and which may be useful on a population basis (the QUALY methodology). They are however not useful on an individual basis, nor outside the proven domain of additivity. The question whether the numbers representing the values of different lives can be added is wrongly put. There is no such thing as a composition of a supra-life from individual lives. The real question is whether the numbers should be added - whether the sum is the morally decisive arithmetical quantity to be calculated here. To this, utilitarianism answers Yes, while egalitarianism answers No. The measurement part of QUALY methodology must be kept conceptually apart from utilitarian ethics.Item Subjektiva sannolikheter(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2007) Malmgren, HelgeItem Time and the Body Schema(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2003) Malmgren, HelgeItem Item Why does music move us?(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2004) Vickhoff, Björn; Malmgren, HelgeItem Why Kant was completely right about space(2017) Malmgren, HelgeItem Why the past is sometimes perceived, and not only remembered(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2004) Malmgren, HelgeItem Without a proper definition, you do not see the phenomenon. The history of a missing diagnosis(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1997) Malmgren, Helge