Browsing by Author "Naurin, Daniel"

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A Network Model of Decision Making Applied to the European Union
(2009-03) Naurin, Daniel; Thomson, Robert; QoG Institute
Network structures constrain and enable political actors. Nonetheless, few models of decision making in international politics take network relations into account. We formulate and test a network model of decision making that incorporates the influence relations among political decision makers. In the first stage of the model, decision makers influence each other’s initial policy positions on controversial issues through their network relations. The extent to which this influence leads to changes in decision makers’ initial policy positions depends on the presence of network ties with other actors and the relative salience of the issue to the decision makers. In the second stage of the model, decision makers take a decision on the basis of their revised policy positions. The dataset we use to test the model combines information on the network relations among the member states’ representations to the EU and decision-making actors’ initial policy positions on controversial issues. The network model generates more accurate predictions of decision outcomes on these issues than does an appropriate baseline model. We draw out the implications of our findings for understanding the role of network relations in international politics.
Does transparency generate legitimacy? An experimental study of procedure acceptance of open-and closed-door decision-making
(2011-09) De Fine Licht, Jenny; Naurin, Daniel; Esaiasson, Peter; Gilljam, Mikael; QoG Institute
Transparency has been a major trend in reforms of political institutions and public administrations in the last decades. This article analyses the main rationale for supplying transparency from the governing elites’ perspective, namely that it generates legitimacy among the constituents. Although working in a goldfish bowl entails costs for governments the prospect of increased support weighs heavily on the other side. But does transparency have the power to increase public legitimacy? We make both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to this question. The theoretical contribution lies in identifying plausible causal mechanisms that may drive a positive – or a negative – link between transparency and legitimacy. We discuss three different theories of decision-making, from which such mechanisms may be derived. We find that the common notion of a fairly straightforward positive correlation between transparency and legitimacy is rather naïve. The effect is highly dependent on the context, which makes transparency reforms rather unpredictable phenomena. Empirically, we study representative decision-making in a school context. We use vignette experiments to test the effect of transparency on legitimacy under different conditions. Our findings indicate that transparency can indeed increase the legitimacy of representative decision-making. People who are informed about decisions which affect their everyday lives are more willing to accept the process by which the decisions were taken if they are given insight into the reasoning behind the decisions. Interestingly, however, this insight need not be derived from “fishbowl transparency”, with full openness of the decision-making process. Decision-makers may significantly improve the legitimacy simply by motivating carefully afterwards the decisions taken behind closed doors (transparency in rationale). Only when transparency displays behaviour close to a deliberative democratic ideal (respectful and rational argumentation) will full openness of the process improve on closed-door decision-making with post-decision motivations.
Dressed for Politics. Why increasing transparency in the European Union will not make lobbyists behave any better than they already do
(2004) Naurin, Daniel
Flexibel integration och utanförskapets politiska pris
(Centre for European Research at Göteborg University, 2004) Naurin, Daniel; Lindahl, Rutger; Centre for European Research at Göteborg University
Network Capital and Cooperation Patterns In the Working Groups of the Council of the EU
(2007-03-26T06:18:26Z) Naurin, Daniel; Lindahl, Rutger; Centre for European Research
Transparency and Corruption: The Conditional Significance of a Free Press
(2005) Lindstedt, Catharina; Naurin, Daniel; QoG Institute
Is making political institutions more transparent an effective method for combating corruption? Common wisdom in the debate and research on the causes of corruption answers strongly in the affirmative. We argue that this optimistic view is both right and wrong. Transparency may be an important medicine against corruption, but only under certain conditions. In order to capture this conditionality the concept of transparency must be distinguished from the interrelated but qualitatively different concepts of publicity and accountability. Facing increased risks of having information about ones bad behaviour made publicly available (transparency) is not enough to affect elite actors’ behaviour, if the information is not likely to be broadly spread, processed and utilised as a ground for putting sanctions on these actors. The theoretical argument is tested in the paper by analyzing the interaction effects between the degree of freedom of the press (as indicia of transparency), free and fair elections (indicating the presence of an accountability mechanism) and the level of education (a condition for publicity) in a cross-country study of 107 countries. The results demonstrate that the failure of previous research to analyze interaction effects have led scholars to draw inadequate and misleading conclusions about the link between transparency, democracy and corruption. Furthermore, it is argued, these findings will help to solve a puzzle in the previous research on democracy and corruption. Taken one at a time transparency and free and fair elections will not help much to reduce corruption. Taken together, on the other hand, they can be a powerful team.