Browsing by Author "Persson, Emil"

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Essays on Behavioral and Experimental Economics – Cooperation, Emotions and Health
(2016-05-25) Persson, Emil
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers that explore issues in human behavior and their implications for policy design. The main method used in all four papers consists of lab experiments, a method that facilitates both variation in key institutional features to allow causal inference and analysis of sharp theoretical predictions in a clean environment. The first two papers investigate how to increase voluntary contributions to public goods, such as local environmental quality. In particular, the effect of imposing a minimum contribution level, which can be exemplified by some minimum level of environmentally friendly action, is investigated with different methodological focuses. The third paper focuses on the influence of emotions on behavior by exploring the strategic consequences of frustration and anger in human interaction, and the fourth and final paper investigates the altruistic behavior of physicians and whether this behavior is affected by payment system and uncertainty in health outcome.
Framing and Minimum Levels in Public Good Provision
(2016-04) Martinsson, Peter; Haileselassie, Medhin; Persson, Emil; Dept. of Economics, University of Gothenburg
Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the choice architecture of framing a social dilemma – give to or take from a public good – interacts with a policy intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public good. We find that cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the take frame in our standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, contributions are significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are crowded out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Our results therefore stress the importance of choosing the frame when making policy recommendations.
Frustration and Anger in Games: A First Empirical Test of the Theory
(2016-02) Persson, Emil; Dept. of Economics, University of Gothenburg
Anger can be a strong behavioral force, with important consequences for human interaction. For example, angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings with others, and this has strategic consequences. Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; BDS) develop a formal framework where frustration and anger affect interaction and shape economic outcomes. This paper designs an experiment testing the predictions based on central concepts of their theory. The focus is on situations where other-responsibility is weak or nonexistent, and in this specific context I find only limited support for the theory: While unfulfilled expectations about material payoffs seem to generate negative emotions in subjects, which is in line with BDS' conceptualization of frustration, behavior is generally not affected by these emotions to the extent predicted by the theory.
IFRS 13 och nationella skillnader angående värderingsprecision för förvaltningsfastigheter
(2017-01-13) Holtudd, Glenn; Persson, Emil; University of Gothenburg/Department of Business Administration; Göteborgs universitet/Företagsekonomiska institutionen
Bakgrund och frågor: När IFRS implementerades i EU 2005 ändrades spelplanen för koncernredovisning och en specifik standard för fastighetsbolag, IAS 40 Investment Property, gav samtliga fastighetsbolag möjligheten att värdera sina förvaltningsfastigheter enligt verkligt värde snarare än enligt anskaffningsvärde. De redovisningsmässiga effekterna av IAS 40 efter dess införande möttes av ett blandat mottagande och kritik lyftes fram om bland annat svårigheten i att jämföra bolag med olika grundantaganden för sina värderingar och problem kring informationsasymmetri. År 2013 började en ny standard gälla, IFRS 13 Fair value measurement, som tagits fram för att tydliggöra och definiera vad som mer exakt gäller vid värdering till verkligt värde. Redovisningen i EU:s olika medlemsstater vilar emellertid på olika traditioner och gemensam lagstiftning kan ej antas vara fullt ut harmoniserad i praktiken. Syfte och avgränsningar: Syftet med studien är att redogöra för olika synsätt kring värdering till verkligt värde samt undersöka om redovisade verkliga värden skiljer sig från marknadsvärden på förvaltningsfastigheter mellan fastighetsbolag i länderna Sverige, Tyskland och Storbritannien. Vi vill även undersöka om IFRS haft någon harmoniserande inverkan på värderingsprecisionen mellan länderna. Vårt urval av data kommer från fem fastighetsbolag från respektive land under en fyraårsperiod 2011- 2014. Metod: Vår studie är kvantitativ och inga specifika antaganden om förväntade utfall görs utan studien är explorativ till sin natur. Frågeställningar och problemformulering utreds genom en kvalitativ analys bestående av olika statistiska tester. Resultat och slutsats: Nationella skillnader i värderingsprecision existerar och från vårt urval är det brittiska bolag som sticker ut i förhållande till de svenska och tyska. De brittiska ligger närmre marknadsvärdet i sina värderingar vilket är intressant mot bakgrund av just Storbritannien som typexempel för anglosaxisk redovisningstradition. Det är dock svårt att dra slutsatser om IFRS 13 och dess inverkan på en redovisningsmässig harmonisering av värderingsprecisionen.
Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions?
(2016-04) Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Persson, Emil; Wang, Xianghong; Dept. of Economics, University of Gothenburg
We examine the effects of either exogenously imposing or endogenously letting subjects choose whether to impose minimum contribution levels (MCLs) in a linear public goods experiment using the strategy method. Our results on contribution levels to the public goods are fairly independent of how MCLs are imposed. We find that the main effect of an MCL on unconditional contributions is that it increases low contribution levels to the MCL imposed, while the effect of those contributing more than the MCL before its introduction depends on the size of the MCL. Unexpectedly, there is much more crowding out for a low MCL than for a relatively high MCL. However, the distribution of contribution types is stable across different MCLs.
Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the institutional formation affect cooperation?
(2016-04) Martinsson, Peter; Persson, Emil; Dept. of Economics, University of Gothenburg
We investigate the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding minimum contribution level in a linear public goods game. Groups either face the minimum level exogenously imposed by a central authority or are allowed to decide for themselves by means of a group vote whether or not a minimum level should be implemented. We find a binding minimum contribution level to have a positive and substantially significant effect on cooperation. The main impact is on the extensive margin, meaning that it is possible to force free riders to increase their contribution without crowding out others’ voluntary contributions. This result is robust to the mode of implementation and thus when the minimum level is enforceable, it is a simple policy that will increase provision of the public good.