Browsing by Author "Rothstein, Bo"

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All for All: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust
(2006) Rothstein, Bo; Uslaner, Eric M.; QoG Institute
The importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the social sciences. A number of explanations have been put forward for the stark variation in social trust among countries. Among these, participation in voluntary associations received most attention. Yet, there is scant evidence that participation can lead to trust. In this paper, we shall examine a variable that has not gotten the attention we think it deserves in the discussion about the sources of generalized trust, namely equality. We conceptualize equality in two dimensions: One is economic equality and the other is equality of opportunity. The omission of both these dimensions of equality in the social capital literature is peculiar for several reasons. One is that it is obvious that the countries that score highest on social trust also rank highest on economic equality, namely the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada. Secondly, these are countries have put a lot of effort in creating equality of opportunity, not least in regard to their policies for public education, health care, labor market opportunities and (more recently) gender equality. The argument for increasing social trust by reducing inequality has largely been ignored in the policy debates about social trust. Social capital research has to a large extent been used by several governments and policy organizations to send a message to people that the bad things in their society is caused by too little volunteering. The policy implications that follows from our research is that the low levels of trust and social capital that plague many countries are caused by too little government action to reduce inequality. However, many countries with low levels of social trust and social capital may be stuck in what is known as a social trap. The logic of such a situation is the following. Social trust will not increase because massive social inequality prevails, but the public policies that could remedy this situation can not be established precisely because there is a genuine lack of trust. This lack of trust concerns both “other people” and the government institutions that are needed to implement universal policies.
Anti-Corruption - A Big Bang Theory
(2007-05) Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Can Efficient Institutions Induce Cooperation Among Low Trust Agents?
(2013-04) Strimling, Pontus; Lindberg, Staffan I.; Ehn, Micael; Eriksson, Kimmo; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
The importance of political institutions for economic growth and social well-being has been demonstrated in a number of studies. Societies in which agents trust that other agents will collaborate in establishing and maintaining efficient institutions produce more social benefits. Yet there is still no solution to the problem known as the social trap, namely how societies can establish efficient institutions when the agents lack social trust. The emerging consensus on Acemoglu & Robin-son’s model is supported by observational data but micro-level data produced in controlled circumstances are absent. To shed light on this perennial problem, a set of laboratory experiments were carried with both high and low trust agents. The main result is that when endowed with strong, socially efficient institutions at the outset, even groups of agents with low social trust are capable of using political inclusion to maintain and also to strengthen the socially efficient institutions thereby achieving collectively high-yielding outcomes. These experiments provide the first experimental support for the importance of strong institutions for developing societies.
Civil War Spain versus Swedish Harmony: The Quality of Government Factor
(2010-04) Lapuente, Victor; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
In 1936, while Sweden gave birth to one of the most peaceful solutions to class conflict (i.e. the Neo-Corporatist Welfare State) with the iconic signature of the Saltsjöbaden Accord, Spain gave birth to the most violent results: the Spanish Civil War. Why did the political, social and economic elites choose collaboration in Sweden and violent confrontation in Spain? Building on recent findings by economic historians, this paper shows the notable socio-economic similarities between the two countries: with European-record levels of social conflict, both were also late industrialist economies enjoying remarkable growth rates as well as decreasing levels of economic inequalities. The paper underlines an overlooked factor: the public bureaucracy. In the key decades of state expansion (late 19th-early 20th century), the semi-authoritarian Sweden – where executive and administrative positions, firmly in hands of the Crown, were unaccountable to the parliament – created and consolidated a meritocratic autonomous bureaucracy which promoted impartiality and the rule of law. On the contrary, the instable and, on average, more liberal Spain – where executive and administrative positions were frequently accountable to parliamentary dynamics – built a patronage-based administration which allowed successive political incumbents to implement their most preferred policies above the rule of law. This made that in 1936, facing a leftist government extensively violating property rights, the Spanish capitalist and middle-classes, until then the least supportive of fascism in Europe, actively supported Franco’s military rebellion, which ended up becoming one of the longest fascist regimes in the history.
Correlates of Corruption
(2014-12) Rothstein, Bo; Holmberg, Sören; QoG Institute
Correlates of Corruption
(2019-06) Rothstein, Bo; Holmberg, Sören; QoG Institute
Correlates of Corruption
(2011-11) Rothstein, Bo; Holmberg, Sören; QoG Institute
Correlates of Democracy
(2011-10) Holmberg, Sören; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Correlates of Electoral Democracy
(2019-05) Holmberg, Sören; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Correlates of Quality of Government
(2014-12) Rothstein, Bo; Holmberg, Sören; QoG Institute
Correlates of the Economist's Index of Democracy
(2014-12) Holmgren, Sören; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Correlates of the Good Society
(2014-11) Holmberg, Sören; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Corruption Kills
(2009-06) Holmberg, Sören; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Various international organizations have documented the existence of corruption and similar practices in many different areas of the health care sector. Empirical studies show that in many poor countries over 80 percent of the population has experienced corrupt practices in the health sector. In rich countries corruption takes other forms such as overbilling and bribes when contracts to build hospitals are signed. The question addressed in this paper is if corruption also has a negative impact on population health. In the theoretical section we argue that the causal link between low levels of Quality of Government (QoG) and population health can be either direct or indirect. The former takes place when, for example, low QoG causes high levels of illegitimate absenteeism among health workers or demands for direct payment of bribes for adequate treatment. The latter (indirect) causal link is when low QoG leads to poverty, low social capital, and low levels of life satisfaction - all leading to difficulties in handling various life challenges which in turn causes health problems. Our central question is policy related. If you want to improve population health, is it better to simply increase spending on health care (and if so, should this be public or private money), or is it better to improve the overall quality of the countries’ government institutions? Using cross section data from more than 120 countries, our findings in the bivariate analyses are that more of a QoG variable is positively associated with higher levels of Life Expectancy, lower levels of Mortality Rates for Children and Mothers, higher levels of Healthy Life Expectancies and higher levels of Subjective Health feelings. In contrast to the strong relationships between the QoG variables and the Health indicators, the relationships between the health spending measures and population Health are rather weak most of the time and occasionally non-existent. Moreover, for Private Health Spending as well as for Private Share of Total Health Spending, the relation to good Health is close to zero or slightly negative. The policy recommendation coming out of our study to improve Health levels around the world, in rich countries as well as in poor countries, is to improve the Quality of Government and to finance health care with public, not private, money.
Corruption, Gender Equality and Feminist Strategies.
(2016-07) Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
The following arguments are presented. 1) Corruption in its various forms is a serious social ill. 2) Democracy is not a safe cure against corruption. 3) Increased gender equality seems to be one im-portant factor behind getting corruption under control. 4) Impartiality in the exercise of public power, not least, when it “translates” into meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the public administration, has a powerful effect on lowering corruption. 5) While some aspects of impartiality are central for gender equality, research results are mixed. Some show that impartial principles promotes gender equality, others show that gender bias exists also in many processes designed to be impartial. Going from these results to policy recommendation is thus fraught with many difficul-ties. One is how to handle problems of legitimacy in the implementation process for various forms of preferential treatment of discriminated groups. Since these problems are impossible to handle, we may be in for a “Churchillian” argument. Like representative democracy, meritocracy may be a far from ideal solution for lowering corruption and thereby promoting human well-being, but it may be the least bad of existing alternatives. Bo Rothstein
Corruption, Happiness, Social Trust and the Welfare State: A Causal Mechanisms Approach
(2010-04) Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Does a more generous welfare state make people happier and increase their life satisfaction? Available empirical research gives a clear and positive answer to this question. This goes counter to many arguments that the welfare state creates a culture of dependency, leads to heavy-handed bureaucratic intrusions into private life, creates problems concerning personal integrity, is bad for economic growth, implies stigmatization of the poor, and crowds out civil society and voluntarism. This counterintuitive result is explained by to which degree social programs are universal in the coverage and structure. Four common misunderstandings of universal welfare states are discussed and refuted: This it is too costly for the economy, that it can not be combined with individual choice, that it does not redistribute in favour of the poor and that it should be detrimental to economic growth. Using a “social mechanism” approach, it is argued that the relation between subjective well-being and universal welfare states operates in a complicated causal pattern with two other variables, the degree of corruption and the level of social trust in society. This approach is used to explain why empirically, countries tend to cluster so that countries with large and mostly universal welfare state programs also have low levels of corruption, a high degree of social trust, and high levels of happiness and social well-being. And vice versa, why countries with smaller welfare systems tend to be higher on corruption, have lower levels of social trust, and lower levels of social well-being.
Creating a Sustainable Solidaristic Society: A Manual
(2011-09) Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy versus Quality of Government
(2008-03) Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
It is often held that the establishment of electoral democracy is key to the creation of political legitimacy. This article challenges this idea and presents an alternative. A large number of empirical studies reveals that electoral democracy has no necessary implications for the establishment of legitimacy. Even in the successful and stable Nordic democracies, there is scant evidence that legitimacy is created on the input side of the political system. For example political legitimacy in the former Yugoslavia broke down not because ethnic groups realized they would become permanent minorities, but because the new Croatian state violated citizens’ rights to the exercise of power. Legitimacy turns out to be created, maintained and destroyed not at the input but at the output side of the political system. Hence political legitimacy depends at least as much on the quality of government than on the capacity of electoral systems to create effective representation.
Ethical Codes for the Public Administration. A Comparative Survey
(2017-11) Rothstein, Bo; Sorak, Nicholas; QoG Institute
This report is an analysis of a number of ethical codes for the national public administration. We present four theoretically grounded reasons for why such codes have been established and in many countries are seen as necessary. These are the limits of laws, the role of expertise in politics, the limits of steering by economic incentives and the problem of “self-interest” in public office. Our analysis departs from earlier studies in that we have included a number of non-western countries. One reason for this is to see if there exists a universal understanding of which values the civil service should uphold or if there are differences between countries from different regions in the world. Our ambition is not to study the effectiveness of these codes or prescribe values that should be included. Instead, our goal is to highlight which values are important across all codes, while also diving in to the deeper conversation about how these codes differ and reasons why this might be. The result is that there are striking similarities in the expression of most core values, particularly Impartiality, Legality, Reliability, Equal Treatment, Integrity, and Professionalism. Differences exist, for example in values relating to building state capacity (meritocracy, competence, performance) which are more prevalent in developing countries. There is also a difference between “aspirational codes” that emphasize values like service and courtesy to the public and “compliance codes” focusing on values like loyalty to the government and rule following.
Exploring a Causal Relationship between Vertical and Horizontal Trust
(2005) Eek, Daniel; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute
Three experiments investigating how a possible causal relationship works between vertical trust (i.e., trust in authorities) and horizontal trust (i.e., trust in others) are reported. In Experiment 1, 40 undergraduate students read and responded to several scenarios describing fictitious events in a foreign society. Based on their effects on trust, the scenarios were hypothesized to be grouped into the following four categories; positive effects on vertical trust, negative effects on vertical trust, positive effects on horizontal trust, and negative effects on horizontal trust. In different participant groups, subsequent to each scenario, participants’ levels of vertical or horizontal trust were assessed. As hypothesized, different scenarios had reliable effects on the two forms of trust. In Experiment 2, 64 undergraduates read the most effective scenarios from Experiment 1 and responded to how participants’ levels of vertical and horizontal trust were affected by the scenarios. Results supported the hypothesized causal relationship from vertical to horizontal trust when trust levels were decreased, but not when trust levels were increased. Results of Experiment 3, where another 48 undergraduates participated, verified that the strength of the causal effect of vertical trust on horizontal trust depends on whether trust is increased or decreased. In conclusion, the results from the three experiments indicate that increased vertical trust has positive effects on horizontal trust, decreased vertical trust has smaller negative effects on horizontal trust, and horizontal trust has no effects on vertical trust.
Getting to Sweden: Malfeasance and Bureaucratic Reforms, 1720-1850
(2012-12) Teorell, Jan; Rothstein, Bo; QoG Institute