Browsing by Author "Sundell, Anders"

Now showing 1 - 13 of 13

Delivering Stability: Primogeniture and autocratic survival in European monarchies 1000-1800
(2012-04) Kokkonen, Andrej; Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
Despite being the probably most common form of political rule in history, monarchies remain understudied in terms of how constitutional arrangements affect leader survival. In this paper, we examine if the principle of succession mattered for the risk that a king or queen would be deposed in Europe, 1000-1800. Specifically, we draw on the work of Gordon Tullock, who argued that hereditary succession orders in-creases the chances of survival for dictators. The proposed reason is that a crown prince constitutes a natural focal point for the ruling elite, which makes it easier for them to avoid costly power struggles. Furthermore, crown princes are generally much younger than other challengers, and can thus afford to wait for the current king to die or abdicate peacefully. The hypothesis is tested on a new dataset, and the results show that the risk of deposition was several times higher in European monarchies not practicing primogeniture. Moreover, the spread of primogeniture to a large extent explains why the risk of deposition became dramatically lower in Europe during the period of study.
Hits close to home: Shootings and support for the Sweden Democrats
(2020-12) Sundell, Anders; The QoG institute
Do instances of public gun violence increase support for Radical Right Parties? Using a pseudo-experimental design, this study investigates the impact of shootings in Sweden 2011-2018 on support for the Sweden Democrats. Using GIS techniques to combine both election results and survey data with police data on shootings, shootings show no consistent political effects. While there are some methodological caveats, the results might reflect that perceptions and fear of crime are more important determinants of political attitudes than actual crime.
Impartiality and Corruption in Sweden
(2013-10) Dahlström, Carl; Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
This paper presents data on corruption and impartiality from a unique survey with local politicians in Sweden, which includes answers from about 78 percent of the 13 361 politicians active in the 290 Swedish municipalities. On the basis of a number of questions related to impartiality and corruption, and after checking for respondent perception bias, we construct three indices: one bri-bery index, one partiality index and one recruitment index. The paper also assesses the external validity of these indices, using previous surveys, crime statistics and media reports on corruption. Our main conclusion after these analyses is that the indices hold water, and thus that it is worthwhile to include them in future, more explanatory studies on both causes and consequences of corruption and impartiality in Sweden.
Is unequal responsiveness caused by high-income earners having more informed opinions?: An empirical test.
(2024-11) Håfström Dehdari, Sirus; Lindqvist; Sundell, Anders; The Quality of Governmen Institute
Previous research has shown that the affluent see more of their preferred policies realized, which scholars of opinion—policy responsiveness attribute to unequal influence. A rival theory instead states that the reason is informational asymmetry: High-income earners have more informed opinions, which align better with policymakers’ decisions. We test this rival theory in a most-likely case, where other sources of unequal opinion—policy responsiveness are minimized: monetary policy, set by an independent central bank. Analyses of survey data from more than 100,000 UK respondents initially reveal several findings in line with the theory: The official interest rate develops in ways relatively more favored by high-income earners, and high-income earners also exhibit better understanding of central bank policy and the economy. Nevertheless, informational asymmetries only explain part of why high-income earners get more of the policy they prefer, even in this most-likely setting. Case-specific reasons for unequal congruence are then explored.
Legalize It: An argument for formalizing petty corruption wen state capacity is low
(2012-03) Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
Corruption in the form of informal payments to bureaucrats for public services are a major problem around the world. There are however few theories of how countries can get rid of corruption. I argue that petty corruption must be understood not only as a problem, but also as a way of financing public services when state capacity is low. If the state is unable to collect revenue from citizens and pay decent wages to bureaucrats, citizens and bureaucrats can engage in a direct transaction: informal payments in exchange for services. Still, the unpredictability and secrecy of corruption has negative consequences for citizens. I there-fore suggest that the situation could be improved by formalizing informal payments; a modest improvement for corruption-stricken societies, but in contrast to other suggested reforms, more feasible. The argument is illustrated with a study of the formalization of informal payments in Sweden during the 19th century.
Losing gamble: Mainstream parties' failed strategy to counter anti-immigrant parties
(2011-03) Dahlström, Carl; Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
The emergence of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe has provoked very different responses from mainstream parties. Some have tried to counter the antiimmigrant parties, while others have tried to recapture lost voters by taking a tougher stance on immigration. Country comparative studies have tried to determine the effectiveness of different strategies, but systematic testing has been impaired by small-n problems. Therefore this paper exploits sub-national variation in 290 Swedish municipalities to investigate the effect of mainstream party strategy on anti-immigrant electoral success. The paper finds that a tougher stance on immigration of mainstream parties is correlated with more anti-immigrant party support, even when controlling for a large number of socio-economic, historical and regional factors. This result indicates that mainstream parties legitimize anti-immigrant parties by taking a tougher position on immigration. However, the results presented in the paper show that it is not enough that one mainstream party takes a tougher position, it is only when the entire political mainstream are tougher on immigration that the anti-immigrant party benefits. What is more, toughness of the parties on the left seem to be more legitimizing than the toughness of the parties on the right.
Nepotism and Meritocracy
(2014-12) Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
Despite the crucial importance of a well-functioning and impartial public administration for growth and well-being, we know little of how such bureaucracies can be created, and why elites allow them to be. One reason for this dearth of studies is that there are few to none quantitative measures of historical bureaucratic development. This paper analyzes the surnames of civil servants in the Swe-dish central public administration over 200 years to track nepotism in recruitment. A decline in nepotism is registered during the 19th century. The nobility however continued to thrive in the ad-ministration even after reform, due to disproportionate access to education. Paradoxically, birth was thus an important predictor of success in a system that generally was considered meritocratic. This continuity could explain why the old elite accepted reform.
Public Administration and Corruption – How To Get the Institutions That Work
(2015-05-07) Sundell, Anders
Corruption is a global problem, impacting on both economic and human development. The last few decades, social science research has paid increasing attention to the problem, but rit emains limited in many aspects, not least because of the lack of reliable data. As a result, there are no reliable aproaches to eliminate corruption, and most reform attempts fail. Still, some countries have apparently managed to reduce corruption to manageable levels. What did they do right? This dissertation aims to contribute to the understanding of how a non-corrupt and effective public administration can be implemented. The three papers in the dissertation approach the problem from different angles, taking the Swedish case as their point of departure. Special emphasis is placed on the issues of remuneration and recruitment of civil servants. Previous research and theory suggests that a meritocratically recruited and salaried civil service is an important deterrant of corruption, and a prerequisite for efficiency. In contrast, civil servants are in many countries recruited on the basis of political loyalty or personal connections, and insufficiently paid. This was also the case in Sweden until, at least, the middle of the 19th century. The story in the papers is however not one of a single defining moment where corruption was rooted out and effective government implemented. The processes studied in the papers stretch over centuries. The main conclusion of the dissertation is that the relationship between public administration, corruption and good government in general is complicated and context-dependent. Some, seemingly corrupt, practices may be functional given the administrative constraints. For instance, informal payments may function as an automatic way of financing the administration, albeit with important drawbacks. Theoretically optimal institutions may also be impossible to implement given political constraints, if politically powerful groups stand to lose from their implementation. In that case, a less ambitious but feasible reform is preferrable. Furthermore, some institutions may serve a country well, but later become obsolete in the face of new challenges. It is thus important to take local context into account, both to identify the institutions that will work best given the circumstances, and to determine how to implement them.
Responsiveness and models of representation
(2022-06) Persson, Mikael; Sundell, Anders; The Quality of Government Institute
Researchontheopinion-policylinkhasshownthatthereisaconnectionbetween public preferencesandimplementedpolicy,albeitbiasedtowardsthepreferencesof the a uent.Wearguethatweneedtolooknotonlytheincomebias,butalsoatthe politicalcontentofthepolicies.Aretheresystematicbiasesagainstcertaintypes of policiesthatcausesuchpoliciestobeundersuppliedrelativetopreferences?We combinesurveydataonawiderangeofissuesfromovertwomillionrespondents with manuallycodeddataonimplementedpoliciesin43countriesovertime.We nd thatthereisapositiverelationshipbetweenopinionandpolicy,butalso nd evidence ofaresponsivenessgap:inmostcountries,implementedpoliciesaremore economically conservativethanwhatthepublicprefers,andtooculturallyliberal.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: less stimulating in corrupt states
(2010-12) Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was an attempt to “jump-start the economy to create and save jobs” by inducing state spending on an enormous scale. 787 billion US dollars were allocated to the act, which included tax cuts and extension of benefits under Medicaid, but also major investment programs. Under the recovery act, 28 government agencies were each allocated a portion of the available funds, and then decided how to spend the money. Most of the money was awarded as grants, loans or contracts to state governments, which then distributed it further to specific projects. However, while the recovery act may have avoided an even deeper recession, it has largely failed to jump-start the American economy in the intended way. Could it be that the stimulus had less effect than it could have had, because of corruption? Research shows that corruption increases costs of public investment, and reduces the efficiency of public spending. In this paper, I attempt to gauge the effects of corruption on the stimulus package by comparing projects awarded grants in the 50 US states, using a two-level modeling strategy. First, for each state, the cost of a project is modelled as a function of the number of people employed in the project, which yields a job cost coefficient. The assumption is that a lower coefficient implies more efficient spending, since projects with the same amount of labor cost more when the coefficient is higher. Second, the job cost coefficient is modelled as a function of corruption in the state, controlling for other state-level factors. Corruption is measured as the number of convictions for corruption in the state 1976-2009 (Glaeser & Saks 2006). The empirical analysis shows that the job cost coefficient is higher in states where more public officials have been convicted for corruption, implying that corruption may have impaired the possible effect of the stimulus package.
The King is Dead: Political Succession and War in Europe, 1000–1799
(2017-09) Kokkonen, Andrej; Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
What Are the Economic Consequences of Aligning Policies with Public Opinion?
(2025-11) Lindqvist, Jesper; Persson, Mikael; Sundell, Anders; The Quality of Governmen Institute
What are the economic consequences of policies that follow public opinion? We combine international survey data with fiscal statistics, and find that the public generally favors increased spending on most areas and lower taxes for most citizens. Consequently, in countries where policy follows public opinion, deficits grow and debt accumulates. The results do not mean that the public necessarily is irrational, as these surveys do not task respondents with balancing the budget. However, they do illustrate the limits of democratic models that uncritically value strict congruence between public opinion and policy.
What is the Best Way to Recruit Public Servants?
(2012-08) Sundell, Anders; QoG Institute
What is the best way to recruit public servants? Governments all over the world have the last decades pondered that question, as parts of increasing attempts to reform civil services and public administrations. Two opposing alternatives can be distinguished: on one hand, traditional civil service recruitment, centralized, through formal examinations, with low discretion and flexibility for managers. On the other hand, private sector-style recruitment that is faster and more flexible, allowing managers to pick the candidates most suitable for each position. In this paper, I test the hypothesis that the context determines which institution that will deliver the highest level of meritocracy (in the sense that skills and ability actually are the decisive factors). More specifically, when the risk for patronage is low, private sector style-recruitment can be at-tempted to find the best candidates, but when the risk instead is high, formal public sector style-recruitment is preferable to prevent patronage and nepotism. Analysis of a dataset containing in-formation about the structures and characteristics of bureaucracies in over 100 countries lends support to the hypothesis.