Browsing by Author "Xezonakis, Georgios"

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    Corruption Voting and Political Context: Testing the Micro Mechanisms
    (2012-10) Xezonakis, Georgios; QoG Institute
    The electoral consequences of individual perceptions of corruption are an important component of political accountability. In this paper I am concerned with what drives variation in corruption voting across countries. While the accountability through elections mechanism is frequently assumed as a force that connects party system and levels of corruption, this mechanism is rarely tested at the individual level. I argue here, and findings suggest that it is so, that features of the party system related to clarity of responsibility in terms of policy outputs and stable system features such as plurality electoral rules might prime corruption as an issue in voting calculations. I test these expectations with individual level survey data from Module 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.
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    Party System Polrisation and Quality of Government: On the Political Correlates of QoG
    (2012-10) Xezonakis, Georgios; QoG Institute
    The Quality of Government (QoG) research program has to date justified the importance of political context in the form of party system type, electoral rules, and political fractionalization for understanding variation in QoG. Arguments about social fragmentation (be that ethnic, class or racial) are also related to governmental outcomes. I propose to contribute to this research program by examining the relationship between party system polarization, as measured by the variation of par-ties’ policy positions (VPP), and quality of government. I argue that party system polarization can explain short and medium term intra-country variation in QoG. Specifically, party system polarization should decrease QoG. My theory suggests two reasons for this expectation. First, party system polarization increases incentives for partiality by the bureaucracy and government institutions, and this has subsequent implications for state efficiency. Second, political consensus enhances cooperation among political actors, and thus the government’s ability to pursue beneficial reform strategies. Findings suggest that this effect is present but conditional upon a country’s experience with democracy.