Prices vs Quantities with Multiple Pollutants

dc.contributor.author	Ambec, Stefan
dc.contributor.author	Coria, Jessica
dc.date.accessioned	2011-09-27T14:16:47Z
dc.date.available	2011-09-27T14:16:47Z
dc.date.issued	2011-09
dc.identifier.issn	1403-2465
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2077/27064
dc.description	JEL classification: D62; Q50; Q53; Q58	sv
dc.description.abstract	We examine the choice of policy instrument price, quantity, or a mix of the two when two pollutants are regulated and firms’ abatement costs are private information. A key parameter that affects this choice is the technological externality between the abatement efforts involved, i.e., whether they are substitutes or complements. If they are complements, a mix policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on the other is sometime preferable, even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mix policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.	sv
dc.format.extent	30	sv
dc.language.iso	eng	sv
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working Papers in Economics	sv
dc.relation.ispartofseries	517	sv
dc.subject	pollution	sv
dc.subject	environmental regulation	sv
dc.subject	policy mixes	sv
dc.subject	tax	sv
dc.subject	emission standard	sv
dc.subject	asymmetric information	sv
dc.title	Prices vs Quantities with Multiple Pollutants	sv
dc.type	Text	sv
dc.type.svep	report	sv
dc.contributor.organization	Dept of Economics, University of Gothenburg	sv