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dc.contributor.authorJohansson-Stenman, Olofswe
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-12swe
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-09T11:14:51Z
dc.date.available2007-02-09T11:14:51Z
dc.date.issued2006swe
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465swe
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/2724
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses normative implications of relaxing the conventional welfare economics assumptions anthropocentrism and welfarism, i.e. that only human well-being counts intrinsically, combined with various types of non-selfish individual preferences. Social decision rules are derived for the optimum provision of a public good (environmental quality). It is shown that in several cases analysed, the basic Samuelson rule still holds, in terms of aggregate marginal willingness to pay.swe
dc.format.extent30 pagesswe
dc.format.extent160023 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenswe
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economics, nr 198swe
dc.subjectAltruism; welfarism; anthropocentrism; cost-benefit analysis;public good provision; social preferences; conditional cooperationswe
dc.titleCosts Benefits Rules when Nature Countsswe
dc.type.svepReportswe
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economicsswe
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
dc.gup.epcid4801swe
dc.subject.svepEconomicsswe


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