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dc.contributor.authorParks, Peter J.swe
dc.contributor.authorAkpalu, Wisdomswe
dc.date.accessioned2005-10-28swe
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-09T11:15:02Z
dc.date.available2007-02-09T11:15:02Z
dc.date.issued2005swe
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465swe
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/2739
dc.description.abstractGold is frequently mined in rainforests that can provide either gold or forest benefits, but not both. This conflict in resource use occurs in Ghana, a developing country in the tropics where the capital needed for mining is obtained from foreign direct investment (FDI). We use a dynamic model to show that an ad valorem severance tax on gross revenue can be used to internalize environmental opportunity costs. The optimal tax must equal the ratio of marginal benefits from forest use to marginal benefits from gold extraction. Over time, this tax must change at a rate equal to the difference between the discount rate and the rate of change in the price of gold. Empirical results suggest that the 3 percent tax rate currently used in Ghana is too low to fully represent the external cost of extraction (i.e., lost forest benefits).swe
dc.format.extent37 pagesswe
dc.format.extent334023 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenswe
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economics, nr 182swe
dc.subjectOptimal taxation; Efficiency; Externalityswe
dc.subjectDynamic analysis; Firm behaviourswe
dc.titleNatural Resource use Conflict: Gold Mining in Tropical Rainforest in Ghanaswe
dc.type.svepReportswe
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economicsswe
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
dc.gup.epcid4480swe
dc.subject.svepEconomicsswe


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