| dc.contributor.author | Johansson-Stenman, Olof | swe |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2004-08-31 | swe |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-02-09T11:15:27Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-02-09T11:15:27Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004 | swe |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1403-2465 | swe |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2776 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Global environmental problems are often assumed to imply extensive inefficiencies since there is no global authority corresponding to the government at a national level. This paper shows, on the contrary, that rich countries in a free unregulated market may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments, given the existence of limited nonpaternalistic altruism. | swe |
| dc.format.extent | 10 pages | swe |
| dc.format.extent | 49432 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | swe |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers in Economics, nr 139 | swe |
| dc.subject | Global environmental problems; externalities; altruism; transboundary pollution. | swe |
| dc.title | Global environmental problems,
efficiency and limited altruism | swe |
| dc.type.svep | Report | swe |
| dc.contributor.department | Department of Economics | swe |
| dc.gup.origin | Göteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Law | swe |
| dc.gup.epcid | 3834 | swe |
| dc.subject.svep | Economics | swe |
