Reforming the Merits: Meritocratic Recruitment and its Effect on Corruption. Case Study of Tajikistan

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to observe the causal mechanism between meritocratic recruitment and level of corruption. Previous cross country analyses showed positive results, however what is lacking in academic literature is micro-analyses that would capture the positive and negative ways of causal mechanism which will be an added value to the academic literature. The current research does not aim to build the hypothesis but rather complements the research on meritocracy by looking at a single case study, taking Tajikistan, a country in Central Asia. The paper identifies and analyses relative difference in implementation of the public administration reform and perception of sample agencies, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance pertaining to meritocracy and corruption. The empirical analysis is based on twenty one interviews with persons responsible for reform making and reform implementation. To validate the answers a group of independent observers is included. The findings of the empirical analysis show that meritocratic recruitment does not have an effect on the level of corruption at its earliest endorsement in a transit country such as Tajikistan. It is formally endorsed within the new public administration system, but instead a majority of civil servants are hired and promoted on the basis of patronage and all types of contacts.