| dc.contributor.author | Olsson, Ola | swe |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-12-13 | swe |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-02-09T11:16:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-02-09T11:16:04Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003 | swe |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1403-2465 | swe |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2831 | |
| dc.description.abstract | ’Conflict diamonds’ refers to the fatal role that diamonds are believed
to have played in several African conflicts. The article analyzes the impact
of diamond abundance on economic growth in light of the broader,
previously discovered empirical finding of a ’curse of natural resources’.
By extending the theory of appropriative conflict, a predator-prey game
is outlined in which a rebel chooses between peaceful production and
predation on natural resources controlled by the ruler. It is shown that
whereas an increase in natural resources might increase the ruler’s public
utility investments, it might also lead to a crowding-out in favor of defense
spendings, which depresses growth. As predicted by the model, a
cross-country regression analysis suggests that diamond abundance has
a ’U-shaped’ relationship with economic growth. | swe |
| dc.format.extent | 26 pages | swe |
| dc.format.extent | 418078 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | swe |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers in Economics, nr 86 | swe |
| dc.subject | diamonds; appropriative conflict; curse of natural
resources; growth; predation. | swe |
| dc.title | Conflict Diamonds | swe |
| dc.type.svep | Report | swe |
| dc.contributor.department | Department of Economics | swe |
| dc.gup.origin | Göteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Law | swe |
| dc.gup.epcid | 2514 | swe |
| dc.subject.svep | Economics | swe |
