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dc.contributor.authorOhlsson, Henryswe
dc.contributor.authorLundholm, Michaelswe
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-08swe
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-09T11:16:07Z
dc.date.available2007-02-09T11:16:07Z
dc.date.issued2002swe
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465swe
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/2835
dc.description.abstractSystematic pediatric evidence shows that the morbidity rates for children in day care are increasing in the group size. Sick children are usually cared for at home by parents. This creates a negative externality of parents&#39 labor force participation. The social optimum implies lower group size than the non--intervention market equilibrium. We study the optimal tax policy. The cost of labor force participation should be increased. This can be done by either or both tax on day care services and a home car allowance. The cost of providing day care should be decreased by a subsidy to entrepreneurs running day care centers. This policy will decrease the group size. It is, however, not necessarily the case that this will decrease labor force participation.swe
dc.format.extent22 pagesswe
dc.format.extent280035 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenswe
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economics, nr 68swe
dc.subjectnegative externalities; infections; day care centers; optimal taxation; Pigouvian taxesswe
dc.titleNegative Externalities in Day Care: Optimal Tax Policy Responseswe
dc.type.svepReportswe
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economicsswe
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
dc.gup.epcid1967swe
dc.subject.svepEconomicsswe


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