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dc.contributor.authorHjalmarsson, Erikswe
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-04swe
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-09T11:16:08Z
dc.date.available2007-02-09T11:16:08Z
dc.date.issued2000swe
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465swe
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/2838
dc.description.abstractRegulatory reform in the Nordic electricity-supply markets has resulted in a single integrated Nordic electricity market. This paper performs an econometric study of market power in the spot market of Nord Pool, the joint Nordic power exchange. I use a dynamic extension of the Bresnahan-Lau model, and weekly data for the period from 1996 through April 1999. To my knowledge, this is the first study of power markets that is not able to reject the hypothesis of perfect competition. The most likely reason for this absence of market power is the low ownership concentration in generation in the integrated Nordic electricity market.swe
dc.format.extent39 pagesswe
dc.format.extent135168 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenswe
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economics, nr 28swe
dc.subjectelectricity markets; deregulation; market power; spot market; power exchange; electricity pool; cointegrationswe
dc.titleNord Pool: A Power Market Without Market Powerswe
dc.type.svepReportswe
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economicsswe
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
dc.gup.epcid2177swe
dc.subject.svepEconomicsswe


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