| dc.contributor.author | Erlandsson, Mattias | swe |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-12-08 | swe |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-02-09T11:16:25Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-02-09T11:16:25Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | swe |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1403-2465 | swe |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2862 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Membership in a monetary union reduces the possibilities to counteract
fluctuations in productivity by monetary policy. One condition
for entrance not to lead to adverse unemployment performance is that
wages are flexible with respect to productivity. Here I show that, depending
on workers' risk aversion, the incentive for workers to choose
more nominal wages flexibility may increase after entrance in a monetary
union. The reason is that if nominal wages are fixed in long-term
contracts, the abolishment of exchange rates decreases the risk in real
wages. On the other hand, the common monetary policy increases
the employment risk. Assuming that individuals' preferences do not
change, the institutional change in monetary policy may increase wage
flexibility in a monetary union. | swe |
| dc.format.extent | 37 pages | swe |
| dc.format.extent | 287566 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | swe |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers in Economics, nr 80 | swe |
| dc.subject | New open-economy macroeconomics; Nominal wage flexibility;Optimal wage setting | swe |
| dc.subject | Monetary unification | swe |
| dc.title | Nominal Wage Flexibility in a Monetary Union | swe |
| dc.type.svep | Report | swe |
| dc.contributor.department | Department of Economics | swe |
| dc.gup.origin | Göteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Law | swe |
| dc.gup.epcid | 2218 | swe |
| dc.subject.svep | Economics | swe |
