The political relationship between the EU member states and the European Court of Justice. A statistical analysis of the credibility of the governments’ threats of non-compliance

Abstract

This thesis focuses on two main theories about the shape and power of the EU and the role of the European Court of Justice: intergovernmentalism, which claims that the ECJ is too restrained by the members in order to make autonomous decisions, and neofunctionalism, which argues that the ECJ is an independent political actor with an agenda of its own trying to create more Europeanization. Based on the research and scientific debate between Carruba, Gabel and Hankla on one side and Stone Sweet and Brunel on the other, this study is concerned with the credibility of the EU member states’ threats of non-compliance with EU law. According to intergovernmentalism, threats of non-compliance shape the behavior of the ECJ and prevent it from becoming a runaway agent. Neofunctionalists disagree and argue that there is no proof that such threats are real and carried out, and that the ECJ is not concerned about them anyway. In this thesis, a statistical analysis has been conducted in order to study if these threats are real. The results show that political disagreements between the national and supranational level do increase the risk of actual non-compliance compared to when the member state was neutral or supported an ECJ decision. The intergovernmental perspective is therefore supported by the results in this study. Still, more studies need to be conducted about the true motives behind the member states threats of non-compliance before any definitive conclusions can be made.