| dc.contributor.author | Niklasson, Birgitta | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-05-11T13:35:23Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-05-11T13:35:23Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-02 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1653-8919 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/38947 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the relationship between New Public Management (NPM) and the political re-cruitment of civil servants. Some claim that NPM has had the unintended effect of muddling the politico-administrational divide, rather than the opposite. This argument is elaborated here by the suggestion that the managerialism and contractualism of NPM have provided politicians with a reason and the means to politicize the civil service by making more political appointments of agen-cy heads. Since there is not much empirical evidence for this relationship, it is also tested. The test is made through a cross-sectional analysis of the politicization of 120 Swedish public agencies in 2009. The results indicate that politicians do not appoint agency heads with a political background more frequently to public agencies with a stronger NPM orientation. Thus, the hypothesis that NPM leads to a politicized civil service is not supported. | sv |
| dc.language.iso | eng | sv |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers | sv |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2013:03 | sv |
| dc.relation.uri | http://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1440/1440594_2013_3_niklasson.pdf | sv |
| dc.subject | New Public Management | sv |
| dc.subject | politicization | sv |
| dc.subject | political recruitment | sv |
| dc.subject | political appointments | sv |
| dc.subject | Sweden | sv |
| dc.subject | agency autonomy | sv |
| dc.subject | agency heads | sv |
| dc.subject | public agencies | sv |
| dc.title | Does NPM Increase the Politicization of the Civil Service | sv |
| dc.type | Text | sv |
| dc.contributor.organization | QoG Institute | sv |
