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dc.contributor.authorStennek, Johan
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-07T09:53:27Z
dc.date.available2015-09-07T09:53:27Z
dc.date.issued2015-09
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/40533
dc.descriptionJEL: J31, J51sv
dc.description.abstractThis paper demonstrates that the decisions by workers of different skills to unite to form industry unions is closely linked to the egalitarian wage policies that such unions pursue. These results help interpret the stylized facts about unions: that they not only increase wages but also reduce wage inequality. I also demonstrate that political caps on collectively negotiated minimum wages may reduce the wages of all blue-collar workers (cf. “internal devaluation”), but that they may also cause unions to disintegrate in the long run.sv
dc.format.extent33sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economicssv
dc.relation.ispartofseries625sv
dc.subjectinequalitysv
dc.subjectwage differencessv
dc.subjectminimum wagessv
dc.subjecttrade unionssv
dc.subjectcollective negotiationssv
dc.subjectstrategic commitmentsv
dc.titleWhy Unions Reduce Wage Inequality, II: The Relation between Solidarity and Unitysv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.type.svepreportsv
dc.contributor.organizationDept. of Economics, University of Gothenburgsv


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