Towards a theory of true and false intentions

Abstract

An ability to discriminate between statements of true and false intent is critical for many legal professionals. However, it is only in recent years that psycho-legal researchers have turned to this topic. The current thesis proposes a theoretical framework aimed to parsimoniously account for past research and to generate novel hypotheses in this burgeoning field of enquiry. In brief, it is proposed that the predictable consequences of active goals will be more pronounced for those with a true compared to a false intention. This is because the predictable consequences of goals aid in goal attainment and this function is lost on the empty goals of a false intention. Hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework were tested in three studies. Study I examined whether indicators of good planning behavior could provide novel cues to discriminate between true and false statements of intent. Truth tellers planned a neutral task, while liars planned a mock-crime. In interviews truth tellers honestly described their intentions, while liars provided a cover-story thematically similar to the truth tellers’ task. The interviews were coded for markers of good planning behavior (e.g., effective time allocation). As predicted truth tellers’ statements were colored to a higher degree than liars’ by such markers. Study II examined the benefit of asking unanticipated questions when interviewing groups of suspects on repeated occasions. The experimental design was the same as that used in Study I. Participants were asked anticipated questions on their intentions, and unanticipated questions on the planning of their intentions. Truth tellers provided longer and more detailed answers than liars, and had higher levels of within-group consistency compared to liars. This was the case for answers to both anticipated and unanticipated questions. No differences between truth tellers and liars were found for between-statement consistency. The results highlight within-group consistency as an important cue to deceit. However, a number of limitations to the unanticipated questions approach were evident. Study III examined the prevalence and manifestation of spontaneous thoughts in relation to true and false intentions. Based on the finding that future tasks generate spontaneous thoughts, it was predicted that those with a true intention would experience task-related spontaneous thoughts to a greater extent than those with a false intention. As predicted, truth tellers reported experiencing task-related spontaneous thoughts to a greater extent than liars. However, these subjective differences did not manifest as discernable cues in interviews. By and large, the proposed theoretical framework received support from the empirical studies. With a specific focus on intentions and goals, the proposed framework makes a unique contribution to deception theory.