Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet

dc.contributor.author	Tsakas, Elias
dc.date.accessioned	2007-06-18T07:40:24Z
dc.date.available	2007-06-18T07:40:24Z
dc.date.issued	2007-06-18T07:40:24Z
dc.identifier.issn	1403-2465
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2077/4575
dc.description.abstract	I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate to the number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agree to participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeated announcements of the number of the participants leads the population to agree not to bet.	eng
dc.language.iso	eng	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working Papers in Economics	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	254	eng
dc.subject	Gamble	eng
dc.subject	private information	eng
dc.subject	communication	eng
dc.subject	common knowledge	eng
dc.subject	JEL: D81, D82, D84, D89	eng
dc.title	Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet	eng
dc.type	Text	eng
dc.type.svep	report	eng
dc.gup.origin	Göteborg University. School of Buisness, Economics and Law	eng
dc.gup.department	Department of Economics	eng