Finanskriser & Transparens - En studie om korruption ur ett collective action-perspektiv

Abstract

Corruption is a widespread problem in large parts of the world. Studying the phenomenon and putting forward useful propositions for decreasing corruption is therefore of immediate importance. A recent contribution to understanding corruption is viewing it as a collective action-problem. This view proposes that the solution, that is, decreasing corruption through collective action, is a large crisis that opens a window of opportunity through which action against corruption can be undertaken. However, so far this proposal lacks empirical scrutiny. This study examines this solution by looking at the effect of financial crises on the level of transparency, a proxy for a larger institutional change, in 64 systematically corrupt countries. We find no general relation between financial crises and change in transparency, but when looking at the effect on different regime types we find a small increase in transparency for liberal democracies. Our conclusion is that a crisis in general won’t lead to collective action against corruption, but that a crisis in liberal democracies can generate this process.