Tax Evasion with a Conscience

dc.contributor.author	Dufwenberg, Martin
dc.contributor.author	Nordblom, Katarina
dc.date.accessioned	2018-08-29T10:50:53Z
dc.date.available	2018-08-29T10:50:53Z
dc.date.issued	2018-08
dc.identifier.issn	1403-2465
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2077/57486
dc.description	Jel-codes D03; H26;H83	sv
dc.description.abstract	How do moral concerns affect tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring an inspection game, modified to incorporate belief-dependent taxpayer guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the authority's more than the citizen's) and regarding policy, in particular fines vs. jail, the role of information campaigns, and the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.	sv
dc.format.extent	33	sv
dc.language.iso	eng	sv
dc.publisher	University of Gothenburg	sv
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working Papers in Economics	sv
dc.relation.ispartofseries	738	sv
dc.subject	Tax evasion	sv
dc.subject	guilt	sv
dc.subject	inspection game	sv
dc.subject	policy	sv
dc.title	Tax Evasion with a Conscience	sv
dc.type	Text	sv
dc.type.svep	report	sv
dc.contributor.organization	Dept. of Economics, University of Gothenburg	sv