| dc.description.abstract | This thesis examines the effect of quality of government on low-intensity internal conflict, and how this relationship could be conditioned by the extent of ethnic division, in a context of developing and newly industrialised countries. It hypothesises that (H1) impartial bureaucracy reduces internal conflict, and that (H2) this effect is diminished in highly ethnically divided societies, and finally test these propositions empirically by using data from the Quality of Government Institute’s Expert Survey and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). The main analysis suggests that quality of government reduces internal conflict. This is consistent with hypothesis 1 and the theoretical framework, which posits that quality of government reduce internal conflict by diminishing the opportunity space for the conflict, by preventing the onset of grievances between societal groups, and finally by making political commitments more credible. The robustness checks call the initial findings into question. The main takeaway with regard to H1 is that the results depend on how “conflict” is measured. When conflict is measured as riots and protests, the results are inconclusive. The results are inconclusive when it comes to how ethnic division affects the relationship between quality of government and internal conflict. In general, the analysis points in neither direction. However, in one model, the data suggests that it is in ethnically divided societies that quality of government significantly reduces violence against civilians – contrary to what was expected. Future research should make an effort to improve data on QoG and conflict. | sv |
