ELITE SURVIVAL FIRST, THEN MERITOCRATIZATION Implications of Elite Survival on the Meritocratization of Bureaucracies: A Panel Data Study from 1820 to 2010

Abstract

Previous research has shown that meritocratic recruitment increases bureaucratic governance and decreases corruption (Evans and Rauch, 1999, 2000). However, less emphasis has been made on why meritocratic practices take root. This paper aims to explore this scientific gap by testing two main hypotheses. Increased rates of tertiary enrolment in autocracies is proposed to have a negative effect on meritocratization (H1). This is suggested to occur as a growing educated class may directly compete with the ruling elites for power. Conversely, increasing rates tertiary enrolment is suggested to increase the likelihood of mertiocratization in democracies (H2). This mechanism is proposed, as democratic rulers are concerned about the provision of public goods. They are thereby willing to sacrifice their natural inclination toward favouring their core constituencies, as costs for retaining patronage networks increases with a growing educated class. Evidence was found for both H1 and H2 – autocracies display a significant negative relationship with mertiocratization as tertiary enrolment increases, while a significant positive relationship is found for democracies. The study was empirically executed using panel data, with measures of tertiary enrolment and meritocracy dating from 1820 to 2010 – which to date is the first time to be tested. In addition, up to 108 countries were evaluated over the time period, using a variety of controls. This paper, thereby provides new evidence based on a larger collection of data than previous studies investigating the causes of mertiocratization.