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dc.contributor.authorOwusu, Shadrack
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-03T11:58:48Z
dc.date.available2020-07-03T11:58:48Z
dc.date.issued2020-07-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/65488
dc.description.abstractIn his question 75 and 76 of the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas argues that the human soul is related to the body as its form such that even after death, the soul has a natural inclination and affinity to the body. This position of Aquinas brings some questions to the fore when discussing him in contemporary philosophy of mind. This paper therefore seeks to respond to one of these arising questions by investigating whether or not Aquinas’ philosophy of mind can be seen as a physicalist view or a substance dualist view. My assertion will be that Aquinas’ position on the body-mind problem cannot be seen as a physicalist or a substance dualist view. This is because none of the two aforementioned dominant theories in contemporary philosophy of mind adequately captures and presents Aquinas’ position.sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStudent essaysv
dc.subjectMedieval Metaphysicssv
dc.subjectAquinassv
dc.subjectBody-Mindsv
dc.subjectProblemsv
dc.subjectPhysicalismsv
dc.subjectSubstance Dualismsv
dc.titleON AQUINAS’ PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. AQUINAS’ CONCEPTION OF THE BODY-SOUL RELATIONSHIP AND ITS RELATION TO SOME CONTEMPORARY THEORIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.sv
dc.title.alternativeON AQUINAS’ PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. AQUINAS’ CONCEPTION OF THE BODY-SOUL RELATIONSHIP AND ITS RELATION TO SOME CONTEMPORARY THEORIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.sv
dc.typeText
dc.setspec.uppsokHumanitiesTheology
dc.type.svepH2
dc.contributor.departmentGöteborgs universitet/Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteoriswe
dc.contributor.departmentGöteborg University/Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Scienceeng
dc.type.degreeStudent essay


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