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dc.contributor.authorLeyman, Marlon
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-12T11:06:52Z
dc.date.available2021-02-12T11:06:52Z
dc.date.issued2021-02-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/67679
dc.description.abstractCoherence theories of justification seem to be plagued by a problem of isolation, which says that mere internal coherence within a belief system leaves the system more or less disconnected from reality. Prima facie a system could after all be completely coherent with itself and yet have nothing to do with the world. In this paper I have tried to offer a solution to this problem by introducing so called mediating states, which simply are mental states that mediate between the system and the world by providing input to a greater or lesser extent. I discuss what properties these mediating states should optimally have while examining and comparing three different ways of construing them, offered by Bonjour's cognitively spontaneous beliefs, Kvanvig & Riggs appearance states and Elgin's deliverances. We see that all of these manage to solve the isolation problem to a certain extent, but that they are problematic in some respects. I discuss these problems and finally put forward my own suggestion, which has many similarities to Bonjour's. It amends what seems to be one of its faults and adopts/reformulates its Observation Requirement to a relatively straightforward form. Thereby I think a potential solution to the problem of isolation is provided.sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.subjectKoherensteorin & isolationsproblemetsv
dc.subjectCoherence & Isolationsv
dc.subjectCoherencesv
dc.subjectIsolationsv
dc.titleCoherence & Isolationsv
dc.typeText
dc.setspec.uppsokHumanitiesTheology
dc.type.uppsokM2
dc.contributor.departmentGöteborgs universitet/Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteoriswe
dc.contributor.departmentGöteborg University/Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Scienceeng
dc.type.degreeStudent essay


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