What explains the credit ratings in economically advanced democracies? Unpacking the role of political stability through ideology, corruption, and transparency
Abstract
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are often referred to in the literature as the “gatekeepers” of the
international credit market. Their assessments may determine a government’s ability to finance its
budget since good credit ratings allow governments to borrow money on more favorable terms. Several
studies have emphasized that democracies receive better access to the credit market than autocracies,
and many scholars have attempted to explain this advantage in terms of institutional constraints, veto
players, or electoral punishment. However, the global financial crisis (2007–2008) has shown that
economically advanced democracies are not immune to debt crises. Thus, the decision-making
mechanisms in democratic countries do not always signal the predictability of debt repayment to CRAs.
This leads to the following question: What explains the variation in credit ratings among economically
advanced democracies? While economic factors are typically seen as the most central determinants of
credit ratings, this dissertation suggests that a government’s political ideology and institutional quality
also influence credit ratings, since CRAs can be expected to value political stability. This dissertation
investigates three factors that may have implications for CRAs’ perception of political stability: political
ideology, corruption, and transparency. This dissertation presents that TAN-leaning governments
(Traditionalist–Authoritarian–Nationalist) receive lower credit ratings on average compared to GAL-leaning governments (Green–Alternative–Liberal) and thus shows that the socio-cultural dimension of
political ideology may matter for CRAs. Furthermore, both corruption or transparency can have
implications for credit ratings, but not necessarily in the same way across all contexts. At the subnational
level, federal transfers can allow relatively corrupt states to retain good credit ratings, despite the
negative consequences of corruption more broadly. Finally, the extent to which government
transparency and media freedom can improve credit ratings may depend on if available information fuel
domestic pressures from interest groups or mass protests, as they can be considered as a threat to political stability in the eyes of CRAs.
Parts of work
Sychowiec, M. (2021) Does political ideology affect a government’s credit rating? The evidence on parties’
socio-cultural positions in European countries. Comparative European Politics 1-18. ::doi::10.1057/s41295-021-00236-7 Sychowiec, M., Bauhr, M., & Charron, N. (2021). Does Corruption Lead to Lower Subnational Credit Ratings?
Fiscal Dependence, Market Reputation, and the Cost of Debt. Business and Politics, 1-19. ::doi::10.1017/bap.2020.22 Sychowiec, M. (2021) Do Transparent Countries Receive Better Credit Ratings? Domestic Audience Costs in Democracies. Unpublished Manuscript. Sychowiec, M. (2021) Does Media Freedom Benefit Sovereign Credit Ratings in Times of Mass Mobilization? Unpublished Manuscript.
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
University
University of Gothenburg. Faculty of Social Sciences
Göteborgs universitet. Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten
Institution
Department of Political Science ; Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Disputation
fredagen den 28 maj 2021, kl. 13.15 i Sappören, Sprängkullsgatan 25, Göteborgs universitet (samt via Zoom).
Date of defence
2021-05-28
maciej.sychowiec@gu.se
Date
2021-05-06Author
Sychowiec, Maciej
Keywords
political economy
credit ratings
sovereign debt
political ideology
corruption
transparency
Publication type
Doctoral thesis
ISBN
978-91-8009-332-3
978-91-8009-333-0
ISSN
0346-5942
Series/Report no.
Göteborg Studies in Politics
166
Language
eng