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dc.contributor.authorBouckaert, Jan
dc.contributor.authorStennek, Johan
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-08T12:12:24Z
dc.date.available2022-04-08T12:12:24Z
dc.date.issued2022-04
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2077/71303
dc.descriptionJEL: K40, L13, L22, L44, L84en_US
dc.description.abstractWe study how the legal profession manages representational conflicts of interest. Such conflicts arise when the same law firm represents clients with adverse interests. They may compromise the legal process, ultimately jeopardizing social welfare. We argue that current ethical standards, emphasizing disqualification, may actually worsen the clients’ situation. Instead, the clients’ interests are today mainly protected by law firms being small. Despite low market concentration, law firms enjoy high earnings as representational conflicts create negative network externalities at the firm level. These profits are not eroded even in the long run as entry occurs through firm splitups.en_US
dc.format.extent57en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Gothenburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers no 820en_US
dc.subjectlaw firmsen_US
dc.subjectprofessional servicesen_US
dc.subjectdual representationen_US
dc.subjectrepresentational conflicts of interesten_US
dc.subjectethical standardsen_US
dc.subjectChinese wallsen_US
dc.subjectrecusalsen_US
dc.subjectnegative network externalitiesen_US
dc.subjectcompetition;en_US
dc.subjectself-regulationen_US
dc.titleConflicts of Interest, Ethical Standards, and Competition in Legal Servicesen_US
dc.typeTexten_US
dc.type.svepreporten_US
dc.contributor.organizationDepartment of Economics, University of Gothenburgen_US


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