| dc.description.abstract | Mass polarization as a phenomenon that divides the electorate on political and societal issues is on the rise globally, and its negative consequences for the well-being of a polity are well documented. Literature on the drivers of these upward trends frequently blame income inequality and immigration for polarizing the masses. However, recently another theory has gained prominence in the discourse as a challenger to these notions, relating to the splintering of audiences and information outlets in the media landscape – i.e., media fragmentation. Media fragmentation and the contemporary high-choice media environment is here said to polarize the masses by capturing consumers into partisan echo-chambers in which they only hear one- sided arguments that solidify their pre-existing beliefs. While there are several studies that support this narrative, they are almost exclusively set in the U.S. Thus, we know little about the generalizability of these results. Is there a general relationship between media fragmentation and mass polarization? Or is this relationship contingent on certain institutional and economic contexts? This study sets out to answer these questions by applying a panel data analysis covering 71 democracies over a 19-year period (2000-2018) (n=1349), using data from the Varieties of Democracies Institute (V-Dem). Due to the great availability of data at my disposal, I am able to show through a set of fixed-effects models that (1); there is no general relationship between media fragmentation and mass polarization; (2) rather, this relationship is contingent on the electoral system of a country, as media fragmentation has a large and positive significant effect on mass polarization in majoritarian systems; (3) income inequality do play a role, but contrary to my expectation, only at the minimum level. | en_US |
