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dc.contributor.authorRhedin, Alexander
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-22T13:55:47Z
dc.date.available2022-06-22T13:55:47Z
dc.date.issued2022-06-22
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2077/72305
dc.description.abstractThis paper is an attempt to answer the question: What is intellectual humility? My main focus will be on two different contemporary accounts of intellectual humility – Whitcomb et al.’s Limitations-Owning Account and Church’s Doxastic Account – where I will argue that while both accounts identify particular aspects of intellectual humility, neither provides us with a fully satisfactory answer to what this virtue amounts to. There is however a straightforward way to revise the limitations-owning account, which turns it into an apt characterization of intellectual humility. In conclusion, I will argue for the position that intellectual humility is the virtue of valuing yourself intellectually as you ought, and that the revised version of the limitations-owning account captures what this actually amounts to.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.subjectintellectual humility, intellectual arrogance, intellectual servility, intellectual virtue, virtue epistemologyen_US
dc.titleIntellectual Humility: What Does It Mean to Be Intellectually Humble?en_US
dc.typeText
dc.setspec.uppsokHumanitiesTheology
dc.type.uppsokM2
dc.contributor.departmentGöteborgs universitet/Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteoriswe
dc.contributor.departmentGöteborg University/Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Scienceeng
dc.type.degreeStudent essay


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