dc.contributor.author | Rhedin, Alexander | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-06-22T13:55:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-06-22T13:55:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-06-22 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2077/72305 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper is an attempt to answer the question: What is intellectual humility? My main focus will be on two different contemporary accounts of intellectual humility – Whitcomb et al.’s Limitations-Owning Account and Church’s Doxastic Account – where I will argue that while both accounts identify particular aspects of intellectual humility, neither provides us with a fully satisfactory answer to what this virtue amounts to. There is however a straightforward way to revise the limitations-owning account, which turns it into an apt characterization of intellectual humility. In conclusion, I will argue for the position that intellectual humility is the virtue of valuing yourself intellectually as you ought, and that the revised version of the limitations-owning account captures what this actually amounts to. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.subject | intellectual humility, intellectual arrogance, intellectual servility, intellectual virtue, virtue epistemology | en_US |
dc.title | Intellectual Humility: What Does It Mean to Be Intellectually Humble? | en_US |
dc.type | Text | |
dc.setspec.uppsok | HumanitiesTheology | |
dc.type.uppsok | M2 | |
dc.contributor.department | Göteborgs universitet/Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori | swe |
dc.contributor.department | Göteborg University/Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science | eng |
dc.type.degree | Student essay | |