Neo-Aristotelian naturalism in light of the modal explanatory account

Abstract

Neo-Aristotelian naturalism is a metaethical theory that takes moral virtue to be a form of natural goodness in human beings, comparable to deep roots in oaks. The theory evaluates a particular species' goods and defects with intuitive teleological judgments called natural-historical judgments. Contemporary Neo-Aristotelian naturalism has resources to answer many of the objections that have been raised against it. However, some objections target the natural-historical judgments in new ways. I deem the charge of anti-individualism and the indeterminacy objection as the most severe of these new objections. One contemporary proponent of the theory that has worked on its evaluative structure is Parisa Moosavi. She proposes to replace natural-historical judgments with a modal explanatory account of evaluation. This paper will discuss the implications of Moosavi’s account for the charge of anti-individualism and the indeterminacy objection. I argue that while Moosavi’s account avoids anti-individualism it risks having to answer the indeterminacy objection by committing to a kind of moral relativism.