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dc.contributor.authorDalgaard, Carl-Johan
dc.contributor.authorOlsson, Ola
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-14T07:48:55Z
dc.date.available2007-12-14T07:48:55Z
dc.date.issued2007-12-14T07:48:55Z
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/8481
dc.description.abstractThe present paper documents that political stability is positively associated with the extent of domestic trade. In explaining this reg- ularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market ex- change, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. As a result, political negotiations, echoing the prefer- ences of the citizens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that en- hance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization become sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non- cooperative under self-su¢ ciency, the political decision making process becomes cooperative in the market economy, as the welfare of individ- uals will be mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries280en
dc.subjectPolitical cohesionen
dc.subjectEconomic growthen
dc.subjectJEL codes: P16, O41en
dc.titleWhy Are Market Economies Politically Stable? A Theory of Capitalist Cohesionen
dc.typeTexten
dc.type.svepreporten
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawen
dc.gup.departmentDepartment of Economicsen


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