Constructive Analysis : A Study in Epistemological Methodology

Abstract

In the present study, it is argued that much of contemporary epistemology has not been conducted in a way conducive to what should be one of its main goals, namely to guide epistemic inquiry in the attainment of our most central epistemic goals. Furthermore, it is claimed that the very reason that epistemology has failed to do so pertains to an entrenched—indeed, in a sense, a literally ancient—but implausible methodology, best understood as the pursuit of definitions by way of intuitions. More specifically, the present study not only (a) argues that we ought to revise this methodology and (b) puts forward an alternative, but also (c) demonstrates the usefulness of this alternative methodology within the analysis of epistemic justification. With respect to the latter, it is first argued that some of the most influential theories fail and that our concept of justification—considering the goals of epistemic inquiry—is best reconstructed in terms of truth-conductivity, and then, through a discussion of psychological research relevant to reasoning strategies, shown how such a reconstructed concept may be used to improve on actual truth-seeking inquiry.