Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
| dc.contributor.author | Sutter, Matthias | |
| dc.contributor.author | Czermak, Simon | |
| dc.contributor.author | Feri, Francesco | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-02-01T15:03:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-02-01T15:03:21Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-02-01T15:03:21Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in oneshot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their firstand second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals. | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1403-2465 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21888 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers in Economics | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 430 | en |
| dc.subject | Strategic sophistication | en |
| dc.subject | beliefs | en |
| dc.subject | experiment | en |
| dc.subject | team decision making | en |
| dc.subject | individual decision making | en |
| dc.title | Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games | en |
| dc.type | Text | en |
| dc.type.svep | report | en |