A Like-Minded Trade-Security Dilemma - A Case Study of the Anti-Coercion Instrument

Abstract

The weaponisation of interdependence marked by the proliferation of coercion is a massive problem for open trading economies, like the EU. This significant scale evolved this initial economic problem into an international political issue requiring international cooperation and obliging actors like the EU, to introduce measures never foreseen before, the Anti-Coercion Instrument. The influence of like-mindedness on the ACI was explored with the support of a thematic content analysis developed based on the theory of trade expectations, attributing to this study a deductive dimension. Two analyses were conducted following this methodology, one regarding the EU institutions involved in the ACI legislative process and a second one towards third countries. The analysis identified that like-mindedness is a key aspect in counteracting coercion and is significantly related to the trade expectations theory. Through several rounds of consultation, the Council influences EC's preferences, bringing it under a desirable like-mindedness. Similar opportunities emerge from international cooperation with states that were a target of coercion. Both analyses show how trade expectations theory could incorporate a network of like-minded actors.