Why Support International redistribution? Corruption and Public Support for Aid in the Eurozone

dc.contributor.authorBauhr, Monika
dc.contributor.authorCharron, Nicholas
dc.contributor.organizationQoG Institutesv
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-09T09:21:03Z
dc.date.available2019-08-09T09:21:03Z
dc.date.issued2018-05
dc.description.abstractWhat factors explain public support for international redistribution? While the European Union has sent billions of taxpayers’ money to over indebted euro countries in an attempt to avoid an economic collapse, these transfers have encountered fierce resistance among both donor and recipient constituents. However, we know surprisingly little about why citizens support or oppose redistribution within the EU. This paper suggests that domestic levels of corruption and institutional quality may be one of the most important explanations for the great variation in public support for financial assistance and aid. Using recent European Elections Survey data merged with data on regional level quality of government, we show that the effects of institutional quality are consistently stronger than macro-economic factors, including economic development, inequality or levels of public debt. We find strong evidence that citizens’ in low corrupt contexts are more likely to support financial assistance to fellow member states. The results have implications for future challenges in securing public support for EU economic integration as well as for our understanding of how and why corruption undermines society’s collective action capacity.sv
dc.identifier.issn1653-8919
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/61430
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperssv
dc.relation.ispartofseries2018:3sv
dc.relation.urihttps://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1689/1689635_2018_3_bauhr_charron.pdfsv
dc.titleWhy Support International redistribution? Corruption and Public Support for Aid in the Eurozonesv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.type.sveparticle, other scientificsv

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