Trust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh

dc.contributor.authorMartinsson, Peterswe
dc.contributor.authorMahmud, Minhajswe
dc.contributor.authorJohansson-Stenman, Olofswe
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economicsswe
dc.date.accessioned2005-03-30swe
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-09T11:15:14Z
dc.date.available2007-02-09T11:15:14Z
dc.date.issued2005swe
dc.description.abstractLevels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between the sent amount in the trust game and stated expectations reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either within or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents’ behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people’s behaviour.swe
dc.format.extent35 pagesswe
dc.format.extent267852 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.gup.epcid4159swe
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465swe
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/2758
dc.language.isoenswe
dc.subjectTrust; trust game; social capital; field experiment; Bangladeshswe
dc.subject.svepEconomicsswe
dc.titleTrust, Trust Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladeshswe
dc.type.svepReportswe

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