Asymmetric Responsiveness: The Effects of Protesters’ Demographics and Policy Preferences on the Political Agenda

dc.contributor.authorLeuschner, Elena
dc.contributor.organizationThe Quality of Governmen Institutesv
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-28T14:51:00Z
dc.date.available2024-11-28T14:51:00Z
dc.date.issued2024-11
dc.description.abstractPrevious research predicts that politicians are responsive to citizens with whom they share demographics or policy preferences. I argue that protests are particularly susceptible to politicians’ di!erential responsiveness. First, protesters’ demographics are relatively easy to identify, potentially increasing politicians’ felt responsibility to respond to protesters they descriptively represent. Second, protests are often perceived as less legitimate than other forms of participation, justifying politicians’ responsiveness to those they substantively represent. In a pre-registered experiment, I tested how 1124 Swedish local politicians respond to protests that vary in who is protesting and what policy demands they raise. Uncertainty is large around the e!ect of shared demographics. In contrast, shared policy preferences increase responsiveness asymmetrically: Left-wing politicians are more responsive but show greater di!erentiation, favoring co-partisan protesters over others. Exploratory analyses reveal that politicians’ priors on protest legitimacy explain why right-wing politicians di!erentiate less and are less responsive to protests, even right-wing protests.sv
dc.identifier.issn1653-8919
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2077/84385
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperssv
dc.relation.ispartofseries2024:12sv
dc.relation.urihttps://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_12_Leuschner.pdfsv
dc.titleAsymmetric Responsiveness: The Effects of Protesters’ Demographics and Policy Preferences on the Political Agendasv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.type.sveparticle, other scientificsv

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