Are Swing Voters Instruments of Democracy or Farmers of Clientelism? Evidence from Ghana

Abstract

This paper is one of the first to systematically address the question of whether strength of ethnic identity, political parties’ candidates campaign strategies, poverty, or evaluation of clientelism versus collective/public goods, determines who becomes persuadable voters (swing voters) in new democracies. It brings together three of the major research streams in comparative politics – the literatures on development, democracy, and political clientelism – to properly situate the swing voter as – potentially – the pivotal instrument of democracy and antidote to the public goods deficit in failed developmental states. Secondly, it contributes with a new and more adequate way of conceptualizing and measuring swing voters. Thirdly, it brings the use of count regression models to the study of swing voters and voting behavior in general. Finally, the paper conducts an empirical analysis using a unique data set from a survey conducted ahead of Ghana’s 2008 elections. The results show that while constituency competitiveness, poverty, education, and access to information impact on swing voting much as expected, the role of politicians’ performance in provision of collective and public goods plays a much larger role than the existing literature makes us expect.