Why Are Market Economies Politically Stable? A Theory of Capitalist Cohesion
dc.contributor.author | Dalgaard, Carl-Johan | |
dc.contributor.author | Olsson, Ola | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-12-14T07:48:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-12-14T07:48:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-12-14T07:48:55Z | |
dc.description.abstract | The present paper documents that political stability is positively associated with the extent of domestic trade. In explaining this reg- ularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market ex- change, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. As a result, political negotiations, echoing the prefer- ences of the citizens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that en- hance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization become sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non- cooperative under self-su¢ ciency, the political decision making process becomes cooperative in the market economy, as the welfare of individ- uals will be mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods. | en |
dc.gup.department | Department of Economics | en |
dc.gup.origin | Göteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Law | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1403-2465 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/8481 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers in Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 280 | en |
dc.subject | Political cohesion | en |
dc.subject | Economic growth | en |
dc.subject | JEL codes: P16, O41 | en |
dc.title | Why Are Market Economies Politically Stable? A Theory of Capitalist Cohesion | en |
dc.type | Text | en |
dc.type.svep | report | en |