Kris i ledningsfrågan! En komparativ studie av tre banker under 1983 - 1990 och upprinnelsen till 1990-talets bankkris

Abstract

This master thesis examines which role the internal organization of a bank during 1983–1990 played in the development of the unprecedented Swedish banking crisis in the 1990s. By examining and comparing three commercial banks in Sweden who were hit differently by the financial turmoil, it is clear that structure, the management and culture of the organization are crucial elements in explaining the development of the crisis. The findings of this inquiry thus show that the roots of the crisis can not be understood by the three micro- and macroelements commonly suggested in previous research: deregulation, lending portfolios and a burst of a real estate bubble. Yet these explanations are indeed important, they are not sufficient. In this study, Handelsbanken, S-E-Banken and Gota Bank are compared. The result of the study shows that all three banks followed a decentralized organizational structure. However, Handelsbanken was the only bank who had adopted FTP-systems to assess risk as well as systems to enhance the feeling of responsibility in regards to the credit giving process by 1983. Moreover, in comparison to S-E-Banken and Gota Bank, Handelsbanken had a well defined and consistent management during 1983–1990. S-E-Banken had adopted a collective management-system as the owners could not agree on a joint strategy or a manager for the bank. Since the merger of Skandinaviska Banken and Stockholms Enskilda Bank 1971, the culture in S-E-Banken was polarized between the former owners and managers until 1990. In the case of Gota Bank, the division between management and the largest owner, Proventus, was ambiguous. The corporate culture in Gota Bank was also focused on expanding the volume of the credit portfolio.