Martinsson, PeterMyrseth, Kristian Ove R.Wollbrant, Conny2010-08-052010-08-052010-071403-2465http://hdl.handle.net/2077/23048When facing the opportunity to allocate resources between oneself and others, individuals may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and preferences to act pro-socially. We explore the domain of conditional cooperation, and we test the hypothesis that increased expectations about others’ average contribution increases own contributions to public goods more when self-control is high than when it is low. We pair a subtle framing technique with a public goods experiment. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conditionally cooperative behavior is stronger (i.e., less imperfect) when expectations of high contributions are accompanied by high levels of self-control.engSelf-controlPro-social behaviorPublic good experimentConditional cooperationText