Biel, AndersJohansson-Stenman, OlofNilsson, Andreas2011-04-282011-04-282011-041403-2465http://hdl.handle.net/2077/25390While many earlier studies have found that people’s maximum willingness to pay for having a good is often substantially lower than their minimum willingness to accept not having it, more recent experimental evidence suggests that this discrepancy vanishes for standard consumption goods when an incentive-compatible design without misconceptions is used. This paper hypothesises that there is nevertheless a discrepancy for goods with a perceived moral character, such as contributions to a good cause, and moreover that the reason for this discrepancy can largely be explained by differences in emotions and moral perceptions. The results from a real-money dichotomous-choice experiment, combined with measurements of emotions and morality, are consistent with these hypotheses.engWillingness to pay-Willingness to accept gapEndowment effectEmotionsEthicsExperimentsText