Sutter, MatthiasCzermak, SimonFeri, Francesco2010-02-012010-02-012010-02-011403-2465http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21888We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in oneshot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their firstand second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.engStrategic sophisticationbeliefsexperimentteam decision makingindividual decision makingStrategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form GamesText