Lyhs, Laura2012-07-252012-07-252012-07-25http://hdl.handle.net/2077/29990MSc in EconomicsAs behavioral economics has become an important input to economic theory in the recent past, when considering public good provision and common pool resource management, it is a logical consequence to include it into policy making and mechanism design for these scenarios, as well. This paper looks at the introduction of an optimal voluntary incentive mechanism to a scenario in which a regulator attempts the governance of a regenerative common pool resource. In the considered scenario, the actors derive utility from monetary gain, but their utility is also affected by the warm glow, derived from a conserving part of the resource for future generations, and their sentiment associated with the presence of a regulatory instrument. Ultimately, the aim of the paper is to show that when economic theory moves away from the definition of the resource appropriator as a ‘homo economicus’, this has implications for the optimal mechanism.engText