Shchetinin, Oleg2009-12-092009-12-092009-12-091403-2465http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21529I show that a simple formal model of reciprocal altruism is able to predict human behavior in contracting situations, puzzling when considered within selfishness assumption. For instance, motivation and performance crowding-out are explained by a signaling mechanism in which provision of an extrinsic incentive signals non-generosity of the Principal and decreases Agent’s intrinsic motivation. The model’s equilibrium predicts behavior in the Control Game of Falk and Kosfeld and in a variant of Trust Game by Fehr and Rockenbach. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.engReciprocal AltruismExtrinsic and intrinsic motivationExtrinsic and intrinsic motivationBehavioral EconomicsText