Department of Philosophy / Filosofiska institutionen (-2008)
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Item Alternatives(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2008) Björnsson, GunnarItem Applying utilitarianism : the problem of practical action-guidance(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothenburgensis, 2004) Gren, JonasThis dissertation addresses the question of whether act-utilitarianism (AU) can provide practical action-guidance. Traditionally, when approaching this question, utilitarians invoke the distinction between criteria of rightness and methods of decision-making. The utilitarian criterion of rightness states, roughly, that an action is right if and only if there is nothing else that the agent can do that has a better outcome. However, this criterion needs to be supplemented, it is said, with some description of a strategy that allows an agent to reach decisions that approximate the utilitarian idea – a method of decision-making. The main question in the essay is if any such method can indeed be justified on the basis of AU. I argue that the justification of a method of decision-making depends on the extent to which it has two different features: practicability and validity. Roughly a method of decision-making is practicable if an agent trying to adhere to the method will succeed in doing so. A method of decision-making is valid if adhering to the method makes the agent approximate the overall goal of AU. I then proceed by examining whether it is possible to justify a belief to the effect that any of the various candidates of methods of decision-making that have been proposed in the literature have these features. My main conclusion is negative. No proposed method of decision-making can be shown to satisfy these desiderata to a sufficient degree. In the final chapter the implications of this conclusion are examined. Does this mean that we cannot justify a belief in AU? Does it mean that AU is false? My conclusion is that whether or not this shows that AU is false depends on what meta-ethical view is the most plausible one. I also present a tentative way of justifying a belief in AU.Item Artificial Neural Networks in Medicine and Biology. A philosophical introduction(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2000) Malmgren, HelgeItem Automatic Computer-Based Diagnosis in Acute Abdominal Pain(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2008) Nalin, Kajsa; Malmgren, Helge; Gunnarsson, Ulf; Laurell, Helena; Åberg, Malin C. B.; Hansson, Lars-ErikItem Autonomy as a Positive Value – Some Conceptual Prerequisites(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2003) Juth, NiklasItem Can a consequentialist be a real friend? (who cares?)(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2003) Lif, JanThe focal point of this dissertation is a recent debate on consequentialism and friendship. The main question considered is, “Can a consequentialist be a real friend?” Prior to that discussion, the notions ‘friendship’ and ‘consequentialist’ are explained. In the second chapter, it is claimed that ‘friendship’ is primarily about holding a distinctive ‘perspective’ on the other person and the relation one have with that person. In the discussion regarding the notion ‘consequentialist’, an overview of the history of utilitarianism is first provided in the third chapter as a background. In the fourth chapter it is then argued that the debate on consequentialism and friendship involves four different types of consequentialists, depending upon how the relation between ‘moral reasons’ and ‘motivations’ is conceived. By means of a critical analysis of the main arguments for and against the thesis that a consequentialist can be a real friend, set in relation to the outlined perspective required for ‘friendship’ and various conceptions of ‘consequentialist’, it is concluded that all types of consequentialists can be real friends. But in the final chapter, it is discussed whether this conclusion can show consequentialism true or false, and it is argued that the answer is no. The reason for this is that the debate itself is based upon a special conception of ‘moral philosophy’, which cannot account for the possible morality involved in friendship. This is revealed by means of certain critique put forward against this conception of moral philosophy which stems from contemporary feminist ethics. The final conclusion is that a consequentialist can be a real friend, but it is doubtful whether anyone really cares about this conclusion, as it does not make any difference to morality.Item Commentary on Lycan’s “Conditional-Assertion. Theories of Conditionals”*(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2007) Björnsson, GunnarItem The Concept of Mental Disorder(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2003) Brülde, BengtItem Conditions for forced learning of graded responses(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2002) Malmgren, HelgeItem Constructive Analysis : A Study in Epistemological Methodology(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothenburgensis, 2007-12-20T08:45:38Z) Ahlström, KristofferIn the present study, it is argued that much of contemporary epistemology has not been conducted in a way conducive to what should be one of its main goals, namely to guide epistemic inquiry in the attainment of our most central epistemic goals. Furthermore, it is claimed that the very reason that epistemology has failed to do so pertains to an entrenched—indeed, in a sense, a literally ancient—but implausible methodology, best understood as the pursuit of definitions by way of intuitions. More specifically, the present study not only (a) argues that we ought to revise this methodology and (b) puts forward an alternative, but also (c) demonstrates the usefulness of this alternative methodology within the analysis of epistemic justification. With respect to the latter, it is first argued that some of the most influential theories fail and that our concept of justification—considering the goals of epistemic inquiry—is best reconstructed in terms of truth-conductivity, and then, through a discussion of psychological research relevant to reasoning strategies, shown how such a reconstructed concept may be used to improve on actual truth-seeking inquiry.Item Controlled Medical Research or Routine Medical Procedure? The Ethics and Politics of Drawing a Line(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1997) Munthe, ChristianItem The controlling soul and the automatic body - a critical account of the control-automaticity distinction(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1998) Radovic, SusannaItem Epilepsy, economics and ethics(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1998) Malmgren, HelgeItem The essential connection between representation and learning(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2006) Malmgren, HelgeItem The Ethics of Investing. Making Money or Making a Difference?(Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2008) Sandberg, JoakimThe concepts of 'ethical' and 'socially responsible' investment (SRI) have become increasingly popular in recent years and funds which offer this kind of investment have attracted many individual investors. The present book addresses the issue of 'How ought one to invest?' by critically engaging with the ideas of the proponents of this movement about what makes 'ethical' investing ethical. The standard suggestion that ethical investing simply consists in refraining from investing in certain 'morally unacceptable companies' is criticised for being both too rigid (often resting on absolute moral rules which lead to an austere conclusion) and too ineffective for individual investors (investors who after all control only a small part of the investment universe). Furthermore, the idea that ethical investing could consist in engaging more actively with the companies one invests in, in order to make them change their ways and become more socially responsible, is criticised for being just as ineffective for individual investors. Some more radical alternatives are elaborated on and defended - for instance, the suggestion that investors should make as much money from their investments as possible and then donate the proceeds to socially worthwhile charities. From similar suggestions, the common idea that there is no conflict between morality and profitability, or that genuinely ethical investing can be just as profitable as mainstream investing, is criticised for being too naïve. Making a difference may indeed require personal sacrifice of investors, but it is argued that the needs of the possible recipients of philanthropy are morally more important than the luxury of investment returns.Item Etiska Principer och Fosterdiagnostik(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2001) Munthe, ChristianItem Fatigue and fatigability - semantic and etiologic perspectives(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 1998) Radovic, Susanna; Malmgren, HelgeItem First-order logic(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2006) Lindström, PerItem Free will, determinism and suicide(University of Gothenburg. Department of Philosophy, 2005) Lorentzon, Frank
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