Doctoral Theses / Doktorsavhandlingar
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Item Moderate nominalism and moderate realism(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2008) Svennerlind, ChristerThe subject matter of this thesis is analytic ontology. Chapters II and III deal with two versions of trope theory, or moderate nominalism; these are defined as ontologies which recognise properties and relations but no (real) universals. The key notion of both theories, trope, is characterised as an abstract particular. What the abstractness amounts to differs between the two. Yet another difference is that simplicity is an essential trait of a trope according to one theory, but not according to the other. Though exact similarity is said to play an important role in both theories, as it turns out, this does not seem to be the case. The ontology dealt with in chapter IV is a mixture of moderate nominalism concerning qualities and realism concerning relations. In it, quality instances (moments) and universal relations are the ultimate constituents of the universe. While relations and moments are considered to be constituents of states of affairs, which are characterised as objects of higher orders, complexes that are objects of the first order are made up of moments on their own. Among these complexes one finds the ordinary objects. Paradoxically, although relations are necessary for the existence of complex first order objects, relations are not thought to be among the contents of these objects. The main subject of chapter V is a particular version of moderate realism; it is an ontology which is realistic in its recognition of universals and moderate in its recognition of instances of these universals. Instances combine to form complex networks. A theoretically motivated claim is that although each instance has a predicational aspect as well as a universal one, it is simple in the sense of lacking internal predicative structure; though, this claim can be called into question. Keywords: analytic ontology, moderate nominalism, moderate realism, particular, universal, abstract, concrete, abstract particular, abstract universal, concrete particular, concrete universal, trope, moment, complex unity, collection, instance, unit attribute, intensional aspect, predicational aspect, continuous composite, articulated compositeItem The Ethics of Investing. Making Money or Making a Difference?(Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2008) Sandberg, JoakimThe concepts of 'ethical' and 'socially responsible' investment (SRI) have become increasingly popular in recent years and funds which offer this kind of investment have attracted many individual investors. The present book addresses the issue of 'How ought one to invest?' by critically engaging with the ideas of the proponents of this movement about what makes 'ethical' investing ethical. The standard suggestion that ethical investing simply consists in refraining from investing in certain 'morally unacceptable companies' is criticised for being both too rigid (often resting on absolute moral rules which lead to an austere conclusion) and too ineffective for individual investors (investors who after all control only a small part of the investment universe). Furthermore, the idea that ethical investing could consist in engaging more actively with the companies one invests in, in order to make them change their ways and become more socially responsible, is criticised for being just as ineffective for individual investors. Some more radical alternatives are elaborated on and defended - for instance, the suggestion that investors should make as much money from their investments as possible and then donate the proceeds to socially worthwhile charities. From similar suggestions, the common idea that there is no conflict between morality and profitability, or that genuinely ethical investing can be just as profitable as mainstream investing, is criticised for being too naïve. Making a difference may indeed require personal sacrifice of investors, but it is argued that the needs of the possible recipients of philanthropy are morally more important than the luxury of investment returns.Item Constructive Analysis : A Study in Epistemological Methodology(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothenburgensis, 2007-12-20T08:45:38Z) Ahlström, KristofferIn the present study, it is argued that much of contemporary epistemology has not been conducted in a way conducive to what should be one of its main goals, namely to guide epistemic inquiry in the attainment of our most central epistemic goals. Furthermore, it is claimed that the very reason that epistemology has failed to do so pertains to an entrenched—indeed, in a sense, a literally ancient—but implausible methodology, best understood as the pursuit of definitions by way of intuitions. More specifically, the present study not only (a) argues that we ought to revise this methodology and (b) puts forward an alternative, but also (c) demonstrates the usefulness of this alternative methodology within the analysis of epistemic justification. With respect to the latter, it is first argued that some of the most influential theories fail and that our concept of justification—considering the goals of epistemic inquiry—is best reconstructed in terms of truth-conductivity, and then, through a discussion of psychological research relevant to reasoning strategies, shown how such a reconstructed concept may be used to improve on actual truth-seeking inquiry.Item Metaethical Relativism : Against the Single Analysis Assumption(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothenburgensis, 2007-12-20T08:30:20Z) Francén, RagnarThis dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard relativism has two main contenders: absolutism – the view that the truth-values of moral statements and beliefs do not vary in that way – and non-cognitivism – the view that moral judgements do not have truth-values, since they express affective or desire-like attitudes rather than beliefs. Almost the entire dissertation concerns the plausibility of standard relativism in contrast to absolutism. Part 1 examines first the two main arguments for standard relativism: that it accounts for the connection between moral judgements and motivation (chapter 2), and for the prevalence of diversity of moral opinion (chapter 3). Then the most common objection is considered: that it is inconsistent with the existence of genuine moral disagreements (chapter 4). I argue that these arguments are inconclusive. Both relativism and absolutism can account for the features discussed. Part 2 focuses on the fact that different people have different strongly held intuitions about the relative or absolute nature of morality. I argue that given a common methodological approach in philosophy and metaethics, which takes such intuitions as evidence of correct analyses, this difference in intuitions suggests that neither a relativist nor absolutist analysis can be correct for everyone’s moral judgements. I argue that this result holds both given semantic internalism (chapter 6) and given semantic externalism (chapter 7). To get one single analysis of everyone’s moral judgements we would have to abandon the intuitionbased methodology. In chapter 8, however, I argue that we can maintain this methodology if we accept analysis pluralism, the view that different analyses hold for different people’s moral judgements.Item Introspecting representations(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2005) Radovic, SusannaDuring the last couple of decades, so called representationalist theories of mind have gained increased popularity. These theories describe mental states in terms of representations of external objects and states of affairs. It is also often held that the content of a subject’s thoughts and perceptions is determined by facts outside her mind, such as social relations between her and other people and causal relations between her and external objects. Some representationalists even argue that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences is determined by external factors in the sense that the truth conditions of statements like: “it looks blue” involve such facts. This entails that so called “phenomenal properties” such as colours are not properties of my experiences or even determined by such properties. This thesis has been labelled “phenomenal externalism” by e.g., Fred Dretske1 and William Lycan2. Introspection has traditionally been described as a subject’s immediate awareness of her own experiences. It has been assumed that the subject has a special and privileged access to her experiences which means that she cannot be mistaken either about the content of her beliefs and experiences or about what they feel like to her. A long lived theory about introspection is that the introspective process is similar to perception, only the objects of the introspective process are “inner” instead of “outer”. This model seems to entail that experiences also share relevant similarities with external objects, such as having intrinsic properties, properties the subject is aware of when observing the objects in question.Item Applying utilitarianism : the problem of practical action-guidance(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothenburgensis, 2004) Gren, JonasThis dissertation addresses the question of whether act-utilitarianism (AU) can provide practical action-guidance. Traditionally, when approaching this question, utilitarians invoke the distinction between criteria of rightness and methods of decision-making. The utilitarian criterion of rightness states, roughly, that an action is right if and only if there is nothing else that the agent can do that has a better outcome. However, this criterion needs to be supplemented, it is said, with some description of a strategy that allows an agent to reach decisions that approximate the utilitarian idea – a method of decision-making. The main question in the essay is if any such method can indeed be justified on the basis of AU. I argue that the justification of a method of decision-making depends on the extent to which it has two different features: practicability and validity. Roughly a method of decision-making is practicable if an agent trying to adhere to the method will succeed in doing so. A method of decision-making is valid if adhering to the method makes the agent approximate the overall goal of AU. I then proceed by examining whether it is possible to justify a belief to the effect that any of the various candidates of methods of decision-making that have been proposed in the literature have these features. My main conclusion is negative. No proposed method of decision-making can be shown to satisfy these desiderata to a sufficient degree. In the final chapter the implications of this conclusion are examined. Does this mean that we cannot justify a belief in AU? Does it mean that AU is false? My conclusion is that whether or not this shows that AU is false depends on what meta-ethical view is the most plausible one. I also present a tentative way of justifying a belief in AU.Item Intentionality and intersubjectivity(Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2007) Almäng, JanThis is a dissertation about the problem of other minds. Its point of departure is the modern philosophical and cognitive-scientific discussion of our attribution of mental states to others, in particular as it is conceived of within the so-called theory theory. The theory theory, and the broader framework of which it is a part, are presented in part 1. In the second part of the dissertation, it is argued that the conception of intentionality normally used in the modern discussions of intersubjectivity cannot adequately explain all facets of human actions. This is because some aspects of actions can only be explained by recourse to intentional states which are not necessarily cognitively accessible. Based upon the Merleau-Pontyian notion of body schema, I develop an alternative account of intentionality, viz. primordial intentionality. The third part of the dissertation argues that the theory theory, and indeed all theories of intersubjectivity that conceive of our ascription of mental states to others as being essentially cognitive, fail to appreciate the nature of the intentionality involved in our habitual capacity for mentalising. The kind of intentionality which is primarily involved in intersubjectivity is not cognitive intentionality, but primordial intentionality. In a Merleau-Pontyian spirit, this mentalising is explicated as a body-schematic transfer. I argue that my Merleau- Pontyian theory can explain how we can habitually attribute mental states to others, and that it furthermore presents a novel solution to the problem of how it is at all possible for us to conceive of the mental states of others.Item Can a consequentialist be a real friend? (who cares?)(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2003) Lif, JanThe focal point of this dissertation is a recent debate on consequentialism and friendship. The main question considered is, “Can a consequentialist be a real friend?” Prior to that discussion, the notions ‘friendship’ and ‘consequentialist’ are explained. In the second chapter, it is claimed that ‘friendship’ is primarily about holding a distinctive ‘perspective’ on the other person and the relation one have with that person. In the discussion regarding the notion ‘consequentialist’, an overview of the history of utilitarianism is first provided in the third chapter as a background. In the fourth chapter it is then argued that the debate on consequentialism and friendship involves four different types of consequentialists, depending upon how the relation between ‘moral reasons’ and ‘motivations’ is conceived. By means of a critical analysis of the main arguments for and against the thesis that a consequentialist can be a real friend, set in relation to the outlined perspective required for ‘friendship’ and various conceptions of ‘consequentialist’, it is concluded that all types of consequentialists can be real friends. But in the final chapter, it is discussed whether this conclusion can show consequentialism true or false, and it is argued that the answer is no. The reason for this is that the debate itself is based upon a special conception of ‘moral philosophy’, which cannot account for the possible morality involved in friendship. This is revealed by means of certain critique put forward against this conception of moral philosophy which stems from contemporary feminist ethics. The final conclusion is that a consequentialist can be a real friend, but it is doubtful whether anyone really cares about this conclusion, as it does not make any difference to morality.Item Fri vilja?(Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2002) Lorentzon, FrankThis thesis, Fri vilja?, deals with one of the classical issues in philosophy: the problem of Free Will. My aim is to dissolve, rather than to solve, the standard formulation of the problem by arguing that problems of this kind seem to arise only by presupposing what is illegitimate or at least mistaken. Chapter one starts with a discussion about the relation between everyday problems concerning freedom and philosophical reasoning about Free Will. In an everyday sense we all know what it is to be free. The questions we have do not ordinarily put in doubt that we ever are free, but are questions about how free we are in specific situations, what we can do to rid ourselves of different constraints to our freedom, and in what degree we are responsible for what we do. But in our everyday experience of ourselves as agents lies the seed to a general questioning about our ability to be free at all, and hence about our ability to act or to be responsible. For instance we talk about Fate or Chance, about our lives not being under our control – either in parts or not at all. But if we never are free, the concept of freedom, as well as the concept of action, dissolves. We would be like marionettes or people in a movie; we would simply react to forces beyond our control, or move through predestined patterns of behaviour that only seem like actions, but really are nothing of the kind.